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ABSTRACT 
 
A Study of Strategies for Oil and Gas Auctions.  
(August 2009) 
David Paul Nordt, B.S., University of Houston; 
M.S., Texas A&M University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Richard A. Startzman 
 
Oil and gas auctions help transact billions of dollars in property sales in the US 
each year.  Value is lost by participants with ineffective strategies.  Federal lease 
auctions have been investigated from public data, but research in this narrow area 
peaked in the 1980s.   Private property auctions did not emerge as a transaction force 
until nearly a decade later; however, today they dwarf federal lease sales in volume and 
value.  This is the first study to publish research on private auctions and the first to 
consolidate historical lease research findings with private auction strategies.  
This dissertation reviews past research, interviews industry professionals, 
analyzes case histories, conducts game experiments, and synthesizes these views for 
strategic application.  Findings from these efforts include the following: Reducing 
uncertainty increases bid values; Federal lease bid values tend to be log normal; 
Aggressive bidding results in a poor portfolio performance; Increasing competition 
increases bid values; Inexperience increases aggressive bidding; A significant group of 
companies do not follow consistent auction strategies; Top winning bid drivers are 
 iv
aggressive 3P reserves and commodity prices; Top value risks are commodity prices, 
capital, and operating expenses; Properties with upside value receive higher bids using 
sealed-bid auctions; Auction players can bid significantly less and sustain a high win 
probability; More money is left on the table in federal lease sales than private auctions; 
Poor data is primary reason auctions fail to complete the transaction; Profit taking is 
primary reason for selling properties though an auction; Market metrics are useful in 
valuation analysis; Producing properties receiver higher bids than undeveloped 
properties with same common knowledge including total proved reserves; Oral auctions 
receive higher bids than sealed-bid auctions with same common knowledge; 
Competition increases bid values in sealed-bid auctions; Reserve size does not increase 
relative value in sealed-bids with same common knowledge other than a magnitude of 
volume. 
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NOMENCLATURE 
 
1P = proved reserves 
2P = proved + probable reserves 
3P = proved + probable + possible reserves 
Av = actual value of property 
Bch = highest competitor bid value 
Bcs = second highest competitor bid value 
Bn = Bid values of “n” competitors 
bo = barrels oil 
boe = barrels oil equivalent 
bopd = barrels oil per day 
Bp = player bid value 
Bs  = second highest bid value 
Būg = geometric mean of bid values for game = (Bp x B1 x B2 x . . . x Bn)1/(n+1) 
Bw = winning bid value 
Cp = competitor profit = Av - Bw (competitor) 
df = degrees freedom 
Ho = null hypothesis 
k = game count 
LOT = money left on table = Bw – Bs (or alternative ratio of Bs/Bw) 
m = player count 
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Mw  = player wins 
n = competitor count 
Ncw  = competitor wins 
PDNP = proved not producing reserves 
PDP = proved producing reserves 
POS = possible reserves 
Pp  = player profit = Av – Bw (player) 
PRB = probable reserves 
PRV = proved reserves 
Pū = mean of all player bid values each game = (Bp1 + Bp2 + . . . + Bpm) ÷ m  
PUD = proved undeveloped reserves 
p-value= probability level of significance 
Pσ = standard deviation of all player bid values each game  
Pσ2      = variance of all player bid values each game 
R1,2 = round 1 or round 2 
R2 = coefficient of determination = the square of coefficient of correlation (r) 
R/P = reserves to production 
Sp = common standard deviation of two populations 
t-test = test statistic 
Vc = competitor value of property 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Importance 
 
Sellers of oil and gas properties desire competitive methods that exceed fair 
market value1, and buyers seek positions between unsuccessful and overly aggressive 
bids.  Auctions provide a popular mechanism for oil and gas property sales in the United 
States (US).  Fig. 1.1 shows industry transactions2 averaged over $32 billion3 per year 
from 2003 through 2007.  Most of these companies used private auction processes to 
ensure competitive offers [Nordt 2004].  The Oil & Gas Investor [2009] listed 75 firms 
providing advisement services and auction processes which reemphasizes the volume 
and value of these transactions. 
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Fig. 1.1—Billions of dollars in private oil and gas property occur in the US each year with most 
through private auction processes (data adapted from John S. Herold, Inc. 2008 M&A Review). 
 
 
 
____________ 
This disseration follows the style of SPE Reservoir Evaluation & Engineering. 
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Fig. 1.2, a graph of total winning bids from US federal lease sales years 2003-
2008, illustrates public auctions also attracted large bid values.  The Department of 
Interior Mineral Management Service (MMS) reported [2008] record winning bids of 
$3.7 billion from central Gulf of Mexico Lease Sale 206 in March 2008.  This sale 
received bids on 615 offshore blocks from 85 companies.  Winning bids from all federal 
lease sales from 1954 through 2008 totaled $75.1 billion.  Deep water Gulf of Mexico 
and offshore Alaska lead in high-value lease sales.  These areas contain large 
hydrocarbon resources in a politically stable country not controlled by national oil 
companies4 and open to companies qualified to explore and operate in this environment.   
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Fig. 1.2—Federal lease sale winning bid totals by year 2003–2008 (data adapted from DOI, MMS 
historical lease sales reports). 
 
 
The amount of money left on the table in these competitive public and private 
auctions is staggering.  Buyers maximize value by strategic analysis to justify lower 
winning bids (i.e., savings), and in strategic opposition, sellers maximize value by using 
better auction processes to increase competitive bids (i.e., profit).
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1.2 Evolution  
 
Auction research has centered on hydrocarbon drilling rights [Klemperer 1999] 
with most studies occurring from the 1960s through the 1980s.  These studies examine 
federal offshore lease sales because results are open to public inspection.  Private 
property auctions followed federal lease auctions decades later.  Strevig [1989] observes 
private property status in late 1980s, “Matching buyers and sellers is a slow arduous 
task.  There is no organized marketplace, or exchange, with perspective buyers clearly 
identified”.  Since the early 1990s organized private auctions dramatically increased, but 
there are no comprehensive studies on the topic. 
Nordt [2005] chronicles the genesis of these private auctions.  Fig. 1.3 documents 
the evolution, from challenges in low commodity prices and the need of liquidity to the 
present sophisticated transaction services.  The 1980s to early 1990s witnessed a 
proliferation of oil and gas equipment auctions. Companies struggled to control expenses 
to offset low commodity prices.  Liquidating surplus equipment inventories through 
auctions became a tactic to reduce costs.  Federal-regulated banks also used auctions to 
dispose of assets in bankruptcy litigation.   As a natural progression of these events, 
several auction firms pioneered selling producing properties through private auctions.   
The use of auctions to sell oil and gas properties evolved into big business with rising 
commodity prices. A wide variety of advisors and services from internet e-bay style 
companies to global investment bankers with large professional staffs participate in these 
processes.  Some industry observers5 believe the next wave of auction evolution involves 
more internet use in evaluations. 
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PERIOD GENERAL CHARACTERIZATION COMMODITY PRICES
Genesis 1980s to Early 1990s Low
  - Proliferation of Oil & Gas Equipment Auction
  - Increase in Property Bankruptcy & Foreclosures 
  - Application to the Oil & Gas Property
Growth Middle to Late 1990s Volatile
  - Improvement in Land, Commercial, Technical Data Quality
  - Sophistication of Market Portfolio Analysis
  - Improvement in Buyer/Seller Assistance
  - Industry Acceptance as Viable Marketing Mechanism
  - Enhancement of Dataroom Utility
Maturing Early 2000s to Present Upward Trend
  - Expansion of Technical Services Volatile
  - Hybrid Auction - Live/Internet
  - Exclusive Internet (Primary Listing Service)
  - Use of Internet For Data Dissemination (Paperless)
Future Next Decade Upward Trend
  - Internet Systems for Evaluation (Integrated Information & Service) Volatile
  - Paperless Transaction
  - Expansion of Technical & Financial Services
  - International Expansion
 
Fig. 1.3–Private property auctions evolved from challenges in low commodity price and the need of 
liquidity to sophisticated transaction services. 
 
Oil and gas property auctions generally fall into two types: 
• Ascending bid (also called open, oral or English auction)—price is successively 
raised until only one bidder remains.  Final called price is the winning bid.  This 
process is most used for producing properties6 with lower value and limited 
development potential. 
• First-price sealed-bid (sealed-bid auction)—each bidder independently submits a 
single bid, without the benefit of seeing competitive bids.  The highest bidder 
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wins at the highest first bid price.  This process is most often used for properties 
that have significant value and development potential.   
Today the sealed-bid auction dominates property divestments in value and volume. The 
sealed-bid auction is also called negotiated sales because a negotiated purchase sales 
agreement [Nordt 2004] is commonly used to formalize the transaction terms.  Oral 
auctions command a smaller market as they tend to be high volume, but low value 
properties. Nordt [2005] estimated a half of billion dollars in ascending-bid auctions 
occur in the US each year (or approximately 2% of all bid property transaction values). 
1.3 Problem 
The objective of this dissertation is to study strategies for oil and gas auctions.  
No comprehensive work on this topic has been published.  I conducted a literature 
review, industry interviews, game experiments, and case histories to accomplish this 
objective.  Four questions with associated hypotheses offered below frame the problem: 
1. What auction strategies are currently used to acquire or divest of properties? 
• Hypothesis 1a–auction players often participate without clearly defined 
strategies. 
• Hypothesis 1b–primary drivers in winning bids are aggressive forward 
price deck, inclusion of probable/possible reserves, and acceptance of 
lower project rate of returns. 
• Hypothesis 1c– Well concentration risk, lack of development potential, 
and data quality are the most common reasons that properties fail to sell 
in auctions. 
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Nordt [2004] observed extreme outliers (i.e., approximately 25% greater than the second 
bid) in bid results from private sealed-bid auction transactions in approximately 20% of 
the projects managed from 2001-2004.  Energy advisors I have asked agree this within 
their experience range of auctions.  These extreme outliers may not have clear and 
concise acquisition strategies in pursuit of properties. Conversely, they may understand 
bidding risks, but competitive pressures such as reserve and rate additions can force 
aggressive decisions to push valuation limits. 
I used interviews with active auction participants to examine the first question.  
As a concept precedent Grayson [1960] effectively used industry interviews to provide 
insight to exploration drilling decisions under uncertainty in the late 1950s and early 
1960s.  Analogous to his approach, I anticipated the interviews to provide a better 
understanding of how the industry assesses property risk in an auction environment. 
2.  Do bidding strategies from earlier research on federal offshore lease sales apply to 
contemporary private auctions?       
• Hypothesis 2a–some auction research strategies developed for offshore 
federal leases apply to private property auctions.   
• Hypothesis 2b–bid models from auction theory and lease sales research 
require modification to accommodate uncertainty in value and risk. 
A review of earlier research on federal leases dissects strategies to find synergies with 
contemporary views of private auctions.  
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3.  Which auction process, sealed-bid or oral, brings more value to the seller? 
• Hypothesis 3a–The sealed-bid auction process brings more value to seller 
when development potential exceeds 30% of the total property value. 
An answer to question 3 significantly impacts the profit of seller and buyer.  Pursuit of 
this question uses interviews and interactive website game experiments with industry 
professionals.   
4.  Can market metrics correlate to commodity price and risk?   
• Hypothesis 4a–market metrics based on $/BOE, $/BOEPD, and annual 
cash-flow multiples can correlate to historical commodity price and risk. 
• Hypothesis 4b–Risked market metric correlations can yield valuations 
similar to more rigorous risked cash-flow modeling. 
Financial groups, such as investment bankers and transaction advisors use market 
metrics to guide value decisions on auctions with proved and probable/possible reserves.  
In addition, energy company senior management routinely compare metrics from past 
property sales against proposed bids to see if they are “out of line”.  A positive answer to 
question four has significant time-saving implication in screening property acquisitions, 
and it can serve to quality check more rigorous cash-flow modeling.   Nordt7 [2006] 
demonstrates linear regression correlations of valuation metrics to historical commodity 
pricing for producing properties in the time frame from 2000 to 2006 where commodity 
prices generally increased.   
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1.4 Summary and Comment 
Billions of dollars in oil and gas auction sales occur in the US each year with a 
continuing growth in volume and sophistication.  Public lease sales were studied in some 
detail through the 1980s, but that work was not updated.  In addition, a comprehensive 
published study on private auctions sales does not exist.  Addressing these two needs this 
study includes:  
• Review of historical auction research. 
• Interviews with industry professionals on contemporary auction strategies. 
• Presentation of case histories. 
• Website auction experiments with industry professionals. 
• Synthesis of historical and contemporary strategies to guide bid valuations. 
• Conclusions, future studies, and reflections from this work. 
1.5 Notes 
1. Garb [1990] discusses fair market value.  His paper includes comparative sales, 
rule-of-thumbs, and cash flow forecast methods.  Comparative sales (market 
metrics) and rule-of-thumb strategies are discussed in Section 5. 
 
2. Data used with permission from IHS Herold (formerly John S. Herold, Inc.)  
Database includes information from press releases, public websites, and direct 
communications with companies.  Review of the database supports that most 
transactions use auction processes to increase competition and maximize value 
for the seller. 
 
3. Currency values in this study are in US dollars. 
 
4. Rasheed [2009] reports that today national oil companies own 93% of the 
world’s proved oil reserves.  The competition of oil and gas reserves from 
integrated and independent energy companies intensifies buying and selling 
properties in the US.  Competitive auction processes provide an efficient way to 
bring buyers and sellers together.  
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5. Formal interviews with industry professionals are presented in Section 3; 
however, other insights into auction strategies gained from these interviews are 
also documented in this study. 
 
6. Values for oil and gas properties are based on reserves that will be ultimately 
produced and sold.  The Society of Petroleum Engineers [Cronquist 2001] and 
Society of Petroleum Evaluation Engineers [Perspectives 2002] discuss reserve 
classifications and valuations.  Proved (PRV), probable (PRB), and possible 
(POS) reserves comprise classification of reserves.  Proved reserves are 
developed producing (PDP), nonproducing (PDNP), and undeveloped (PUD).  
Proved undeveloped, probable, possible reserves require significant investment 
to develop into proved producing.  They have progressively higher degrees of 
uncertainty associated with them; therefore, they would normally have a lower 
value on a risked unit basis.  Financial markets often use the terminology 1P, 2P, 
and 3P to report proved, (proved + probable), and (proved + probable + possible) 
reserves. 
 
7. Nordt, D.P. 2006. Market Value Metric Correlations. Unpublished Texas A&M 
Directed Study Presentation, 1-15 (May).  This study develops market metric 
correlations for producing properties from a private database presented by Nordt 
[2005]. 
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2. HISTORICAL VIEW 
 
2.1 Game Theory 
 
2.1.1 General Game Concepts 
I use Stevens [2008] and Binmore [1992] for general game theory definitions.  A 
game consists of players, strategies, and payoffs.  The player makes rational decisions 
using strategies which lead to profit or loss.  Rational behavior necessitates the player’s 
strategic choices result in the best outcome to himself1 given his knowledge at the time.  
The best decision for a player is his dominant strategy, and he always prefers higher 
payoffs (profit).  Utility is the satisfaction a player receives from the outcome.  Utility 
can differ for each player as a function of risk love and risk aversion.  A player is risk-
adverse that is always ready to sell an opportunity at an amount equal to its expected 
value, and conversely, a player is risk-loving that is willing to always buy an opportunity 
at an amount equal to its expected value.  A player is risk-neutral if he is indifferent to 
buying or selling.   Nash equilibrium occurs when no player can get a better expected 
payoff by unilaterally changing his strategy.  Common knowledge is information that all 
players have and they know each other has it.   
2.1.2 General Auction Concepts 
I use Klemperer [1999] and Binmore [1999] for auction theory concepts.  The set 
of rules that govern how an object is to be sold are called an auction.   An auction is a 
game form often used when there is uncertainty about the true value of an object.  A 
seller is not likely to know all the buyers’ true valuations, and buyers usually do not 
know at what reserve price the seller is willing to sell.   Revenue Equivalence Theorem2 
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implies when bidders are risk-neutral, have common values, but independent estimates 
of values, then all auction processes will generate the same revenue; however, when the 
conditions are not met, then different auction types can have different outcomes.   
Most oil and gas auctions use the first-price oral or sealed-bid mechanisms.  
Price is successively raised until only one bidder remains in oral auctions, and the final 
called price is the winning bid.  The winning price guarantees an outcome as good as the 
second-best bid price, but no better.  In sealed-bid auctions each bidder independently 
submits a single bid, without the benefit of seeing competitor bids.  Under the conditions 
that satisfy the equivalence revenue theorem outcome potentially is no better than the 
second-best bid price.  However, without those constraints the winning bid could be 
better. 
Oil and gas auctions are considered common value (i.e., the property ultimately 
has the same value3 to all bidders, but each bidder has his own estimate of what it is 
worth).  Auction bidders routinely have the same information to evaluate the property, 
but the uncertainty in the interpretation of that information provides a range of estimates 
of its value.   
Bidders are said to be symmetric if they draw from this same distribution of 
common knowledge.   This pool of common information is called complete information.  
Imperfect information is where bidders are not aware of previous internal decisions by 
other bidders or information unknown to all bidders.  It is possible for oil and gas 
auction buyers to have both complete and imperfect information. 
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A potential outcome of common value auctions is the winner’s curse.  This is the 
tendency for the winner of an auction to overpay for the common-value purchase.  It 
occurs because the actual value to the different bidders is unknown but correlated (i.e., 
related to the same common knowledge) and the bidders make bidding decisions based 
on estimated values. The logical winner tends to be the bidder with the higher property 
value estimate, and therefore, he tends to overpay for the asset. 
2.2 Auction Studies 
Key early and developmental studies to gain historical perspective of oil and gas 
auction strategies are reviewed below.   
2.2.1 Early Research, 1956-1974 
         Friedman [1956] pioneered competitive auction strategy with his approach to 
optimize expected profit in contract bidding.  He supposes a government agency inviting 
companies to bid on a contract through a sealed-bid auction.  He assumes each bidder 
desires to maximize total expected profit.  Friedman’s model includes a probability 
distribution of true cost as a fraction of estimated cost and a probability distribution of 
submitting a winning bid.  The distributions require studying past data of cost estimates, 
actual costs, previous bid patterns, and knowledge of the number of competitors. 
Maximum expected profit is found by plotting expected profit for a given bid and 
locating the maximum value.  Friedman acknowledges the number of competitors 
submitting bids is not likely known.  He alternatively proposes combining all historical 
ratios of opposition bids to his bidder’s cost estimate into a probability distribution 
function and determining the probability of being lower than some average bidder.  The 
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probability of being lower than all independent average bidders is then a multiple of the 
number of bidders. 
Arps [1965] presents a sealed-bid strategy for acquiring undeveloped acreage 
independent of the number of competitors.  His optimization approach appraises 
property values under a profit constraint, uses past behavior patterns of competitors, and 
maximizes the number of tracts purchased under this capital constraint.  He determines 
property value from volumetric calculations (hydrocarbon reserves), net operating 
income per unit of reserves, and risked dry-hole costs. He assumes that most bidders use 
the same standard geological and geophysical information; however, he also comments 
that the interpretation of such data may vary over a wide range.  He informs us that bid 
results often follow log-normal distributions using a 1954 Federal OCS Sale (Tract 
0419) as an example.  He reasons that the total impact of multiple variables in value 
calculations cause this outcome.  Arps assumes the historical geometric mean values as 
good indicators of the future value.  This is a common assumption by statisticians as the 
average of all parameter estimates often approaches the actual value [Rose and 
Associates, 2007].  He uses a Monte Carlo simulator to derive a probability distribution 
relating historical mean bids to the winning bids.  He uses this correlation to develop an 
optimum bid strategy to maximize the number of leases under the constraints of capital 
and profitability.    
Brown [1966] examines decision-making under uncertainty in competitive 
bidding for federal offshore Louisiana leases.  His work discusses risk, portfolio 
selection, variability of results, abstract bid theory, leasing process, lease bid statistics, 
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and a bid simulation model.  He proposes maximizing expected profit on a lease tract 
that requires estimating the probability that a bid will be the winning bid for the tract and 
the probability distribution of opponent bids.  His model simulates the expected profit 
from a bid for each tract.  Brown’s three variables of focus in his model are: estimated 
present value of the tract, the likely number of competing bidders, and the probability 
distributions of possible competitor bids.  His model predicts less competition yields 
larger dispersion of the bids, and stronger competition reduces expected profit. 
Crawford [1970] surmises that appraisal of an offshore lease prior to bidding is a 
product of many factors so that the bids may plot as a straight line on probability paper 
(i.e., a log-normal distribution).4  Examples of Texas offshore lease sale bids for single 
tracts are plotted on probability paper to demonstrate this log-normal distribution 
behavior. He also provides an example of a tract that did not exhibit the typical behavior.  
He speculates that nonconforming bids occur with extreme outliers at lower ends as a 
result of minimum bidding to win the lease. 
Capen, Clapp, and Campbell [1971] cite industry reports [OGJ 1969, 1970] that 
historical rate of returns for offshore Gulf of Mexico development are low.  They believe 
bidders on the average value properties correctly; however, a bidder consistently wins in 
a competitive bid situation only when he significantly overvalues the property.  They use 
a stochastic simulation model to analyze how much can be paid over the value of the 
lease tracts given the level of competition.  The simulation model requires the 
probability of competitor bidding and bid fractions5. Assumptions include competitor 
tract values follow a log normal distribution and the actual value is the geometric mean 
 15
of that distribution.  Simulation runs compare winning to losing bids based on random 
variables, and compute present values, probabilities, and expected present value at each 
competition level.  They conclude that a bidder should lower his bid level when: 1) he 
has less information than competitors, 2) the uncertainty of the property value estimate 
increases, and 3) there are more than three competitors.   
2.2.2 Developing Research, 1975-1994 
Dougherty and Nozaki [1975] propose that bid strategy requires an estimate of 
the value of the tract and application of a bid fraction to optimize expected gain.  
Application of a bid fraction allows for losses on tracts when actual value is less than the 
bid.  Uncertainty of property value estimates and competition level influence the 
optimum bid fraction.  They study the impact of variance in parameters.  These 
parameters include standard deviation of estimates, competitor value estimates, number 
of competitors, and bid fraction of competitors.  They find optimum bid fraction is 
determined by aggressive competition, accuracy of estimate, and the number of 
competitors.  They conclude competitors’ aggressiveness (i.e., higher bid fractions) 
influences a bidder’s optimum fraction the most, and optimum bid fraction should 
decrease as uncertainty of estimated value increases. 
Dougherty and Lohrenz [1976] conduct a statistical analysis of bids for federal 
offshore leases from1954 through 1974.  They find that the average of standard 
deviation of the natural logarithm of bid values do not change over time (i.e., different 
lease sales) and equals approximately 1.0 standard deviation with a standard error of 
0.15.  The ratio of the high bid to geometric mean of all bids increases with competition 
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while the average percent money left on the table decreases.  Joint bidders tend to bid on 
leases receiving more bids and higher bonuses per acre than do solo bidders.  Joint 
bidders tend bid higher than the geometric bid value than solo bidders.  Winning bids of 
joint bidders tend to have higher relative standard deviation than solo bidders. 
Dougherty and Lohrenz [1977] analyze money left on table (i.e., the winning bid 
compared to the second bid).  They review 2,580 leases receiving 9,142 sealed bids of 
federal offshore lease sales from years 1954 to 1975.  Their analysis supports that lease 
bids tend to follow log-normal distributions; however, higher bids tend to depart from 
the log-normal distribution.  Individual lease sales can not be considered as having been 
drawn from a population of bids with a single standard deviation; however, a broad 
middle range of leases can be considered drawn from a population of bid values with a 
single standard deviation (derived from the average of the natural logarithm bid value 
variances) equals 1.09.  The expected value of money left on table decreases as 
competition increases and increases as standard deviation increases. 
Dougherty and Lohrenz [1977] find no consistent correlation supporting solo or 
joint bids decrease the number of competitive bids.  The statistical study was unable to 
develop quantitative evidence indicating that increases in bids of any class cause a 
decrease in the total number of bids.  The findings indicate that the effect of preventing 
two or more majors from bidding jointly may have increased the majors' proportionate 
sphere of influence.  After a ban was lifted that prevented joint bidding the number of 
bids per lease in which a major participated was higher than before.  
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Lohrenz and Dougherty [1977] state that bidding results are determined by how 
aggressive a player is relative to his competition.  They find that aggressive or 
conservative bid patterns are not consistent over multiple lease sales.  When bidders bid 
jointly their bid fractions and winning bids tend be higher.  They define relative 
aggressiveness as bidder's bias.  An unbiased bid splits population of other bids into two 
equal parts with bid fraction as 0.5.  Variation reflects differences in thinking and 
attitudes of those preparing the bids.  
Lohrenz and Dougherty [1983] present evidence that more information about a 
lease does not mean bidders agree more on bid value, and that overall disagreement 
between bids consistently vary over time.  On an average an aggressive bidder who wins 
is less profitable than a conservative bidder who wins.  Profits cannot be observed from 
bid statistics; however it is likely that bidders’ results are not satisfactory as observed 
from industry studies6 where the pretax rate of returns on Federal offshore oil and gas 
leases in the Gulf of Mexico ranged from five to eleven percent.   
Kagel and Levin [1986] conclude common value auctions constitute a market 
setting in which participants may be susceptible to judgment failures that affect market 
outcomes.    They present clinical auction experiments with high and low bid values and 
different private and public information signals.  They find providing public information 
about the value of the item increases seller revenue in the absence of a winner’s curse, 
but produces contrary results in its presence of a winner’s curse.  Inexperience produces 
a strong winner's curse.  Limited competition produces profits closer to the Nash 
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Equilibrium versus winner’s curse.  With continued experience a bidder's strategy 
improves.  
Lohrenz [1987] notes bottom line profits in the Gulf of Mexico are disappointing.  
More aggressive bidders tend to be less profitable than the more conservative bidders.  
Maximizing profit or reserves are two ways to optimize bidding.  Maximizing reserves 
does not make sense as it could lead to negative profit.  Models are built to optimize 
profit based on number of bidders, unknown bidders, and comparing joint versus solo 
bidders.  A bidder achieves better results by exposing limited budget across leases of 
interests rather than bidding jointly.  A bidder that does not apply an optimal bidding 
strategy will drive prices up and make less profit.      
Lohrenz [1988] documents past performance and projection of future profits from 
federal oil and gas lease sales are poor.  He advises to be wary of reasons that justify 
high bonuses.  Meade studies showed rate of returns after tax of 9.02%.  The market for 
leases was intensely competitive, rate of returns were low, and contested leases were 
lower than uncontested leases.  
Lohrenz [1991] states competitive bidders seek to divide shares of "pies" of 
unknown value that each asset represents.  Strategies can imply negative share and the 
seller can obtain greater value than the asset value.  Lohrenz uses bid simulation to 
examine the results of different bid fractions of the estimated value on the net value to 
bidder, competitors, and seller.  He finds better estimates of underlying value of offered 
assets can increase net expected value, but may require more aggressive bidding.  Better 
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information leading to more accurate estimates of asset value can diminish the seller 
share.  
Phillips and Summers [1983] summarize several lease sale auction papers with a 
focus on lease bid models.  They compare the Capen, Clapp, and Campbell [1971] and 
Brown [1966] models with emphasis on the former as a base model.  The Capen et. al. 
model uses the concept of the actual value with an index of 1.0 (i.e., they assign a value 
of 1.0 to the actual value for every property) and then application of a bid fraction to 
calculate the bid level. 
More recently, Furtado, Suslick, and Rodriguez [2008] discuss a lease model 
they developed using data from seven Brazilian offshore lease sales.  They contend their 
model can be in formulating bidding strategies for different world regions and geological 
settings possessing similar competitive bidding profiles.  In seemingly the reverse of the 
Capen et. al. model they determine bid fractions through stochastic simulation and then 
use the bid fractions to determine a range of expected monetary value (profit). 
2.3 Summary and Comment      
2.3.1 Key Concepts 
Table 2.1 summarizes key concepts outlined in this section emphasizing 
chronology, researcher, and observations. 
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TABLE 2.1—SUMMARY OF KEY CONCEPTS PRESENTED IN AUCTION LITERATURE 
 
 
Year 
 
Research 
 
Observations  [Evidence] 
 
 
Type 
1956 Friedman 
 
A winning bid with maximum profit requires knowing competitors and 
historical bid results.   [Theory] 
 
Sealed-bid 
General 
1965 Arps 
 
Competitors use same data, but interpretation widely varies.  
Geometric mean of bid values indicates the actual property value.  
[Theory, Empirical] 
 
Sealed-bid 
Lease 
1966 Brown 
 
Maximizing expected profit on a lease tract requires knowing 
probabilities of winning and opponents’ bids.   [Theory, Empirical] 
 
Sealed-bid 
Lease 
1970 Crawford 
 
Appraisal of lease sale value is a product of many factors and bids 
routinely assume log-normal distribution.  [Theory, Empirical] 
 
Sealed-bid 
Lease 
1971 Capen  
Clapp 
Campbell 
 
Bidders value properties correctly on average, but consistently win 
only when they overvalue.  Decrease bid with decreasing data, 
increasing uncertainty of value, and increasing number of competitors.  
Set bid fraction at less than 30% for strong competition.  [Theory, 
Empirical] 
 
Sealed-bid 
Lease 
1975 Dougherty 
Nazaki 
Bid requires estimate of the actual value and application of a bid 
fraction to optimize expected gain.  Competitors' aggressiveness 
influences a bidder's optimum fraction the most.  [Theory] 
 
Sealed-bid 
Lease 
1976 Dougherty 
Lohrenz 
 
The ratio of winning bid to geometric mean of all bids increases with 
competition and money left on table decreases.  Joint bidders tend to 
bid higher than the geometric bid and show bid variances greater than 
solo bidders.  [Empirical] 
 
Sealed-bid 
Lease 
1977 Dougherty 
Lohrenz 
The bid money left on table decreases as competition increases and 
increases as bid variances increase.  [Empirical] 
 
Sealed-bid 
Lease 
1977 Dougherty 
Lohrenz 
There is not a consistent correlation supporting that solo or joint bids 
decrease the number of sealed bids.  [Empirical] 
 
Sealed-bid 
Lease 
1977 Dougherty 
Lohrenz 
 
Aggressive or conservative bid patterns are not consistent over 
historical lease sales.  When bidders bid jointly their bid fractions and 
their winning bids tend to be higher.  [Empirical] 
 
Sealed-bid 
Lease 
1983 Dougherty 
Lohrenz 
 
More information about a lease does not indicate bidders have less 
variance in bids.   There is nothing in bonus bidding which define a 
method to improve profits.  [Empirical] 
 
Sealed-bid 
Lease 
1986 Kagel, 
Levin 
 
 
Public information of value increases seller revenue in the absence of a 
winner's curse, but produces contrary results in its presence.  Limited 
competition produces profits closer to the Nash Equilibrium.  
Experience improves bidders’ profit.  [Clinical Experiments] 
 
Auction 
General 
1987 Lohrenz 
 
 
The more aggressive bidder tends to be less profitable than the more 
conservative bidders.  A bidder does better by exposing limited budget 
across leases rather than bidding jointly.   [Empirical] 
 
Sealed-bid 
Lease 
1988 Lohrenz 
 
 
Past performance and projected future profits from oil and gas leasing 
are poor.  Studies indicate historical competition increases rate of 
returns decreases.  [Empirical] 
 
Sealed-bid 
Lease 
1991 Lohrenz 
 
 
More accurate estimates of underlying value of a bid can increase net 
expected value, but may require more aggressive bidding.  Better 
information leading to more accurate estimates can diminish the seller 
share.  [Theory] 
 
Sealed-bid 
Asset 
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The following discusses application of some of these concepts: 
• The oral auction is the industry process of choice for predominately developed 
producing properties. 
o The use of different auction processes opposes the hypothesis of the 
Revenue Equivalence Theorem which states all auction types yield the 
same result.  Some of the reasons for this difference include: 1) risk 
nature of players, 2) uncertainty of evaluation parameters, 3) competition 
level, 4) asymmetrical buyers; and, 5) budget constraints.          
• Reducing uncertainty can increase bid values of sophisticated buyers.   
o Most buyers have access to the same public knowledge, but sellers’ that 
provide additional commercial, technical, and operational data can 
decrease uncertainty for participants and improve overall bid values. 
• Lease auctions7 tend to follow log normal distributions.   
o On the average a bidder can reduce his initial bid and still maintain a 
high probability of winning8. 
• From a buyer’s perspective reducing the bid fraction as the number of 
competitors increase will increase profit. 
o  However it also decreases the probability of not winning, but the 
evidence shows continued aggressive bidding over time contributes to 
poor portfolio results. 
• Inexperience increases aggressive bidding.   
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o The seller should not count on the outlier buyer who is either 
inexperienced or ignorant.  Although both are possible in any give 
auction, the best process maximizes information dissemination to buyers.  
• Competition increases the probability of higher bids if the evaluations occur from 
the same pool of common knowledge.  
o More players increase the chance of higher valuations leading to higher 
bids.  The winner’s curse is rooted in increased competition.   
2.3.2 Other Comments 
Most auction buyers bid from their independent valuations of an asset.  They 
often have similar common knowledge of properties; however, uncertainty surrounds 
value parameters.  Properties can also have different utility to participants based on 
factors such as infrastructure, cost of capital, technical and operational capabilities.  For 
a large integrated energy company participation in a single auction game has minimum 
impact; however, cumulative strategies for auction processes over time can impact even 
large portfolios.  For small companies a single auction event9 can have large 
consequences.  Oil and gas auctions can present factors beyond control or prediction 
(e.g., long-term future of commodity prices).   
Managing risk [Bernstein 1996] is intrinsic to good business decisions.  
Therefore good understanding of probability, uncertainty, and utility (i.e., the elements 
of risk10) in the valuation process is essential.  Probability is the chance that an event is 
successful.  If the event is successful, uncertainty is the range of possible outcomes.  
Utility measures satisfaction of a successful outcome to the game player.  Evaluation 
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parameters contain these elements of risk.  The foundation of property value is based on 
reserves which have probability of occurrence and uncertainty of size.  The utility of the 
production depends on processing and market leading to revenue available to each 
auction player.   Uncertainty in evaluation parameters drives greater range in value of 
properties. 
Disparity of knowledge between competing bidders can cause a broad 
distribution of bids. Most auction processes provide a level of common knowledge to 
increase the selling price and attract buyer interests [Nordt 2004]; however, there is 
always the possibility that a bidder did not have time to fully evaluate the property, does 
not understand the level of risk, or has additional information that other bidders and 
possibly the seller does not have.  In addition, buyers can have limited funds in which to 
buy auction properties.  This can cause offers to be less than expected, or for buyers to 
concentrate value on a single auction property.  
Evidence supporting the winner’s curse potential exists in competitive auctions, 
and at times, need or ignorance may cause a buyer to sell a property below market.  Nash 
equilibrium is a difficult achievement (i.e., no player can obtain better results by 
changing his position).   
Increased competition increases potential for bidder to over pay for a property.  
A successful bidder is one that on average makes a profit from acquiring properties.  
With increased competition actual bids should be decreased to avoid the winner’s curse.  
Sealed-bid auctions potentially yield significantly higher profit to sellers as uncertainty 
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of value increases, whereas oral auction can encourage bidders to pay up to their 
maximum reserve value as uncertainty decreases. 
Some of the above observations appear intuitive; yet, the winner’s curse in public 
and private auctions still occur11.  This appears as good news for the individual seller, 
but erodes confidence of buyers.  I interviewed a growing number of buyers who believe 
competitive auction processes significantly cause over valuation of properties and their 
plans were to reduce participation. 
2.4 Notes     
1. I will use the masculine gender for personal pronouns in general context for 
simplicity, but please consider to read as he or she, herself or himself, etc. 
 
2. Klemperer [1999] defines the Revenue Equivalence Theorem as follows: 
 
Assume each given number of risk-neutral potential buyers of an object 
has a privately-known signal independently drawn from a common, 
strictly-increasing, atom-less distribution.  Then any auction mechanism 
in which i) the object always goes to the buyer with the highest signal, 
and ii) any bidder with the lowest-feasible signal expects zero surplus, 
yield the same expected revenue (and results in each bidder making the 
same expected payment as a function of her signal). 
 
3. The value of a property is assumed to be the same for each auction participant; 
however, the ultimate value is a function of technical, operational, commercial, 
and financial ability.  Common value is a reasonable assumption given the 
maturity and knowledge base of the industry, and a necessary inference to 
advance certain discussions (e.g, bid models) presented in this paper.  One 
notable exception can occur when regulated utility companies with guaranteed 
profit compete against non-regulated companies. 
 
4. The Central Limit Theorem states that random variables that are additive will 
assume a normal distribution, and variables that are multiplicative will assume a 
long-normal distribution because the product of the variables is the sum of their 
logs.  
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5. Bid fraction is the ratio of a bid to the actual value of the property.  The bidder of 
the property knows what he bids, but no one knows the real value of the property 
until the end of its life. 
 
6. Barrow [1972], Lohrenz [1978], Mead, Sorensen [1980].  These studies are 
included in the references. 
 
7. Results in Section 3 show at private sealed-bid auctions can fit a Beta 
distribution, while federal lease sales tend to fit log-normal distributions.  Private 
property auctions usually have a larger component of producing and undeveloped 
proved reserves versus unproved resources. 
 
8. I was curious as to how a more recent federal lease sale mirrors past lease sale 
research.  A review of the largest federal lease sale, LS 206 [2008], on record 
showed the ratio of second bids to high bids averaged 43% from 223 tracts with 
two or more bids.  Additional data from this lease sale will be presented in 
Section 3.    
 
9. Anecdote—I managed a sealed-bid auction transaction where the seller of 
modest means originally bought a property at an oral auction, held the property 
for one year, and resold it for profit fifteen times his original purchase.  The 
transaction was a life style change for the seller as he had risked a substantial 
amount of personal wealth in the initial transaction. 
 
10. Drilling an oil and gas well illustrates these elements of risk in the evaluation of 
undeveloped reserve potential.  A geoscientist estimates the probability of 
successfully finding hydrocarbons based on factors such as source rock, reservoir 
rock quality, and trapping mechanism.  If successful, the reserve volume will be 
uncertain as it represents a range of possible recoverable volumes based on such 
factors as original oil in place, reservoir drive mechanism, and drainage area.  
Utility varies from player to player.   For a small energy company it could be a 
company maker or breaker in reserve volume or costs.  For a large energy 
company a single well has minimal impact on the company portfolio. 
 
11. Section 3 presents evidence from private sealed-bid auction results that winning 
bids average greater than 10% above the second bid and current public federal 
lease sales have much greater ratios (see note 8 above). 
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3. CURRENT VIEW 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Oil and gas auction research peaked in the 1970s and early 1980s.  These studies 
focused on federal lease sales over the concern of poor project economics and the 
availability of public data.  Organized private property auctions first appear in the late 
1980s to become a $30 billion a year business (see Section 1.1, Importance).  Published 
research on private auctions is limited, and data, if available, comes from public press 
releases or personal communication.   
This section presents material from industry interviews that explore private 
auction strategies and results.  Texas A&M University Office of Research Compliance 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) approved the use of interview material reported in 
Sections 3.2 and 3.3.  All interviews were confidential with full knowledge by 
participants that information they provided might be presented in research findings.  
Section 3.4 summarizes a narrower study [Nordt 2004] that gives additional insight into 
the subject. 
3.2 Industry Interviews 
3.2.1 Overview 
An industry group of 22 individuals independently participated in strategy survey 
interviews to identify the top strategies most impact oil and gas property auction results.  
Only interviewees familiar with contemporary processes participated in the surveys.  
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They provided answers to the following questions: 
• Does your company participate in auction processes with committed strategies? 
• What strategies most impact the value of offers? 
• What risk factors most impact the value given to offers? 
• When does the sealed-bid auction receive a better value than oral-bid auction? 
These questions investigate the central problem framed in Section 1.  The interview 
questions were peer reviewed by several volunteer industry professionals that were not 
involved the interviews.   The results of these interviews establish an industry perception 
of auction processes and provide data for designing simulated auction game experiments 
discussed in Section 4.   
Table 3.1 provides participant companies and positions.  The participants 
included employees of integrated energy companies, independents, and energy 
advisement firms with various positions of executive managers, managers, and technical 
professionals.  The participants represent a 76% response from 29 interview requests.  
Most of the participants are from top 100 US producing energy companies and several 
top advisement firms.  
 
 
TABLE 3.1—PARTICIPANT COMPANIES AND POSITIONS 
 
          
      Company Types 
 
 
Count 
 
 
          Participant Positions 
 
 
Count 
 
         Integrated Oil 
 
 
   2 
           
         Executive Manager 
  
   14 
 
         Independent 
 
  11 
       
          Manager 
 
     6 
 
         Energy Advisor 
 
 
   9 
 
 
           Technical Professionals 
 
     2 
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The participants were informed the study concerned strategies of oral bid and 
sealed-bid auctions.  Strategies were defined for the interviews as adaptations that serve 
as an important function in achieving success within the constraints of the participants’ 
companies.  Some participants chose not to answer all the questions; therefore, the total 
response count does not always coincide with the number of participants for each 
question.     
3.2.2 Question 1 Responses—Committed Strategies  
The majority of responses in Table 3.2 specify that their companies develop 
strategies for auction participation; however, 14% believe that their companies do not 
have a systematic approach to auctions.  Nine of the total participants came from energy 
advisement firms which by their business missions have a strategic approach to 
competitive marketing of assets.  Considering only the energy company responses, the 
interview sample suggests that up to 20% of energy companies may not have formal 
strategies for auction participation.   
 
 
TABLE 3.2—RESPONSES TO COMMITTED 
AUCTION STRATEGIES 
 
 
                           Yes                           No 
 
                        19 (86%)                  3 (14%) 
 
3.2.3 Question 2 Responses—Top Strategies  
Interviewees received a list of strategies that might impact competitive auction 
bids and were asked to rank them in order of importance.  Strategies not listed, but 
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deemed important, could be written in.   Table 3.3 catalogs the top five strategies ranked 
from highest to lowest.  
 
 
TABLE 3.3—TOP FIVE STRATEGIES BY RANK THAT 
IMPACT COMPETITIVE OFFERS 
 
 
          1.  Aggressive Valuation of Non-proved Reserves 
 
 
          2.  Forward Price Deck 
 
 
          3.  Acceptance of Lower Rate of Returns  
 
 
          4.  Core Technical Competencies  
 
 
          5.  Hedging 
               Master Limited Partnerships (tie for 5th) 
 
      
Strategy one—the inclusion of non-proved reserves (probable and possible) in 
valuing auction properties coincides with recent reversal in the industry strategy from 
international projects towards North American energy investments.  Stark [2007] states 
that the worldwide competition for reserves has caused many large public or privately-
owned companies to return to US and Canadian open market for acquisition 
opportunities in unconventional resource plays, deepwater and arctic environments.   
 Strategy two—forward price decks are a large source of uncertainty for sellers 
and buyers.  Rapidly rising commodity prices can cover a poor evaluation preceding a 
winning bid, and an acquisition followed by falling and sustained lower commodity 
prices can destroy returns of a thoroughly analyzed auction property.  Hedging (strategy 
five) can protect returns for a period of contracted production, but it can also limit the 
upside in revenue. 
Strategy three—lower rate of returns may also relate to the paradigm shift of 
increase interest in US properties.  This pressure can force property valuations to higher 
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levels.   The Wood McKenzie Group [Deep Pockets 2007] reported on the first of two 
record breaking deep water lease sales in a decade coinciding with rising crude prices, 
“The U.S. Gulf of Mexico (GOM) Central Lease Sale 205 attracted record amounts of 
interest.  Spending for Deep Water blocks alone topped US$2.66 billion  . . . .”  These 
assets provide one of the large hydrocarbon resource potential in politically stable waters 
and open to private companies.  
Strategy four—core technical competencies are often touted as strategic 
competitive strengths of energy companies.  A possible foreshadow implication is that as 
the playing field of acquiring properties narrows companies will continue to merge (or 
devour) weaker companies further weakening claims to technical and operational 
leadership.     
Strategy five—hedging reduces exposure to price risk and eliminate the effects of 
negative fluctuations in income [Roberge 2005].  A major challenge in auction sales is 
the risk of volatile commodity prices.  Buying properties during sustain period of rising 
commodity prices often means higher acquisition, operating, and development costs.  If 
prices significantly fall post acquisition companies may face large asset write downs on 
acquisition projects.  Write downs equate to value lost for equity holders.  However, 
hedging also reduces the opportunity to capture upside profit in times of rising 
commodity prices. 
Strategy five (tie)—the master limited partnership (MLP)1 was the darling of the 
investment universe at the time of these interviews.  Deutsche Bank [2007] captured 
MLP essence as follows:   
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Apparent arbitrage gap between market values of long-lived, capital 
intensity assets and their implied valuation within MLP structure.  Look 
at recent returns.  Under a 1986 Act of Congress designed to promote 
energy supply (legislation that arrived just as the oil market crashed), 
certain energy assets can be run in a partnership structure, known as 
Master Limit Partnership or MLP.  The key benefit at the company level 
is effectively no tax is paid – liability is passed to shareholders as 
partners.  The partnership benefits from no tax and a lower cost of 
capital.  The shareholders benefit from attendant high dividend yield, on 
which of the tax liability is deferred. 
 
MLPs allow up to a 30% plowback of capital to maintain production.  Few US fields fit 
a profile of low decline and maintenance.       
3.2.4 Question 3 Responses—Modifying Risks 
Interviewees ranked risk factors that most impact competitive auction bids.  They 
could write-in additional risks they believed important.   Table 3.4 documents the top 
five risks.  
 
 
TABLE 3.4– TOP FIVE RISK FACTORS BY 
RANK THAT IMPACT COMPETITIVE OFFERS 
 
 
        1.  Commodity Prices 
 
 
        2.  High Capital Expenditures 
 
 
        3.  High Operating Expenditures 
 
 
        4.  Low Reserves to Production Ratio 
 
 
        5.  Well Concentration     
 
      
Risk one—commodity prices rank significantly above other risk factors in 
impacting competitive offers.  A commercial study2 illustrated that a ten percent change 
in price can have a magnitude greater impact on net present value than capital and 
operational expenses.  Fig. 3.1 shows the volatility in commodity prices as West Texas 
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Intermediate crude oil increased nearly three-fold in three years from 2005 to 2008 
followed by a precipitous decline in the last quarter of 2008.  Commodity prices are a 
complicated variable dependent on many variables such as supply and demand, finding 
and development costs, conservation, access to resource, politics, and alternative energy 
developments.  Tertzakian [2007] offers a compelling scenario that price volatility will 
continue at greater extremes as world crude oil demand permanently exceeds supply. 
 
Fig. 3.1—WTI crude oil drastically increased and declined from 2007–2008 illustrating commodity 
price volatility.   
 
Risk two—high capital expenses refer to excessive future costs associated with 
exploring and developing hydrocarbon reserves on a unit production basis.  Average 
finding and development costs of the top 50 US companies rose from $9.55/boe to 
$15.83/boe [John S. Herold, Inc. 2008] during the years 2003 to 2007.  The move toward 
more unconventional and deep water GOM reserves in the US creates a value disparity 
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between legacy reserves and newly discovered fields.  The uncertainty in capital 
requirements due to technical and commercial challenges creates more risk. 
Risk three—high operating expenses refer to excessive future costs for producing 
and processing production for sales on a unit production basis.  Average production 
costs of the top 50 US companies rose from $5.66/boe to $11.92/boe [John S. Herold, 
Inc. 2008] during the years 2003 to 2007.   
Risk four—low reserves to production ratio (R/P) refers to excessive production 
rates relative to proved producing and undeveloped reserves which indicates a producing 
field are closer to its end of life cycle.  Rasheed [2009] reports that US has an oil R/P of 
11.7 years in contrast to the top five global oil reserve countries which have oil R/Ps 70 
or greater.     
Risk five—well concentration refers to excessive production relative to a few 
wells, and if damaged, would require significant investment to replace. 
3.2.5 Question 4 Responses—Best Auction Type 
83% of the interviewees expect sealed-bid auctions to receive higher bids than 
oral auctions when the undeveloped property value exceeds 30% of the total property 
value.   The increase in uncertainty of valuation from proved producing to non-
producing reserves categories explains this response.  This also agrees with how the 
industry uses auction processes in marketing properties. 
3.3 Auction Results 
Public news releases sometimes report winners of private sealed-bid auctions; 
however, the complete bid results are not attainable.  Confidentiality of losing bids keeps 
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the private sealed-bid auction winner engage in completing the transaction by reducing 
winner’s remorse and the potential of renegotiating the offer price downward following 
the auction.  The SPEE Perspectives on Fair Market Value [2002] confirms that data 
regarding private property sales are treated as highly confidential. 
The interviews of energy advisors presented a unique opportunity to sample 
private bid data results from auction asset sales over a five year period from 2002-2006.  
Sample data were requested from five energy advisement firms. The requests included 
one auction per year for five years from each firm.  Four of the five firms responded 
with representative data.  Requested data included index values of all offers, the ratio of 
producing to total proved reserves (PDP/PRV), and the R/P ratio from five transactions 
with five or more offers for each transaction. One firm provided results for more than 
five transactions and with less than five offers for some of those transactions.  Another 
firm did not provide proved producing/total proved reserves or production/total proved 
ratios.  This explains the differences in the number of data points for some categories.   
Table 3.5 summarizes 28 private sealed-bid auctions.  Bid results were given in 
index form without names of the auction players to protect confidentiality.  Auction 
transactions managed by these companies typically range from $25 million to $1.5 
billion.   The second highest bids in the auctions average 0.88 with a standard deviation 
0.13.  The average winning bidder could offer 10% less and retained a high probability 
of maintaining the winning position.  In two auctions (7% of the sample data) the second 
bids matched (i.e, the same as) the winning bids.  On an average the same approximate 
gap of value exists between second and third highest bids.  
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Fig. 3.2 shows the second highest bids (green dots) contrasted to the winning 
bids.  All winning bids (red squares) are indexed as 1.0.  Significant value gaps of 
approximately 50% occurred between the winning bids and the second bids on auctions 
#12 and #15 (7% of the sample data).  Several advisor firms related that extreme 
winning outliers occur in approximately 10%-25% of their sealed-bid auctions.  This 
suggests that extreme outliers recognize inherent risks to a much lesser degree than their 
competition; or, conversely, they may understand bidding risks, but internal pressures 
(e.g., targeted reserve additions) force aggressive decisions to push valuation limits.  It 
also partially3 explains why sellers prefer sealed-bid auctions when there is uncertainty 
in the value (i.e., properties that are not fully developed).   
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Private sealed-bid auctions typically experience smaller bid differences between 
the top bidder and competitors compared to public federal sealed-bid lease sales.  Arps 
[1965] expresses evaluations of federal offshore leases consider many product dependent 
variables that can have larges variations (e.g., formation area, thickness, porosity, and 
 
TABLE 3.5—DATA SUMMARY FROM 28 PRIVATE  
SEALED-BID AUCTIONS 
 
 
        Category 
 
Average of Auctions 
 
           Bids per transaction 
 
     8.5 
 
           2nd Highest Bid 
 
     0.88 w/SD of 0.13 
 
           3rd Highest Bid 
 
     0.80 w/SD of 0.13 (27 data points) 
 
           Mean of All Bids 
 
     0.74 w/SD of 0.12 
     0.71 (geometric) 
 
 
           Proved Producing/Total Proved 
 
    52% (22 data points)  
 
           Production/Total Proved, yrs 
   
    11.0 (22 data points) 
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hydrocarbon saturations) which sometimes leads to winning bids that are a magnitude or 
larger than competitor bids.  In contrast, the properties of private property auctions 
frequently have better reservoir control on valuation variables. 
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Fig. 3.2—Second highest bids and mean of all bids compared to winning bids from 28 private sealed-
bid auctions (source: confidential interviews with four energy advisors). 
 
Fig. 3.3 presents a histogram distribution of index bid data from all 28 private 
sealed-bid auctions.  An index of 1.0 for winning bids was entered only once; however, 
second bids that had an index of 1.0 (i.e., were entered as many times as they occurred).  
The statistical tests4 (Anderson-Darling, Kolmogorov-Smirnov, Chi-Square) of these 
distributions considered ranked the beta distribution (shown as a continuous green line) 
as a best fit of the data. 
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Fig. 3.3—Histogram distribution of private sealed-bid auction index data for 28 auctions with 
winning bid entered only once.  
 
Fig. 3.4 recreates the fitted beta distribution from Fig. 3.3 with minimum and 
maximum truncations of 0.10 and 1.0 respectively.  Truncation was set as 0.10 because 
all the data resides above that point, and 1.0 is the index for the winning bids.  The P90, 
P50 (median), P10 are 0.91, 0.69, and 0.40 with a mean of 0.62 and mode of 0.77.   
Table 3.6 summarizes the beta distribution statistics.  This beta distribution is not unique 
as it comes from a limited sample, but it does offer a distribution type that could be used 
in stochastic bid models, and resembles the distribution profile of many private bid 
auctions that I have analyzed.  It is interesting that the standard deviation (0.19) of this  
private auction sample is much less than the federal lease sales statistics (approximately 
1.0).  This occurs because the properties have historical production associated with the 
sales.   
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Fig. 3.4—Fitted Beta distribution of 28 auctions with winning bid entered once and minimum and 
maximum truncations at 0.1 and 1.0.  
 
 
 
TABLE 3.6 – BETA DISTRIBUTION  
STATISTICS OF FIG. 3.4 
 
 
   Mean 
 
0.67 
   Median 0.69 
   P10 0.40 
   P90 0.91 
   Mode 0.77 
   Standard Deviation 0.19 
   Variance 0.04 
   Skewness -0.40 
   Kurtosis 2.40 
   Coeff. of Variability 0.28 
   Minimum 0.10 
   Maximum 1.00 
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3.4 Case Studies 
3.4.1 Private Sealed-Bid Auctions 
I presented data (Nordt 2004) from twenty-four private sealed-bid auctions over a 
three-year period from 2001 through 2003.  These asset auctions ranged between $4 
million to $40 million.   The auctions included properties from most major U.S. 
producing basins with the highest concentration of properties in Texas, Oklahoma, and 
Louisiana.  Table 3.7 summarizes the transaction parameters. My intent this research 
was to determine why properties were sold through auctions and the cause of failure in 
these processes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
Table 3.8 presents strategic reasons the study group sellers auctioned their 
properties.  Profit-taking strongly topped the list followed by non-core property, 
developmental risks and operational expenses.  The study concluded poor data quality 
 
Table 3.7 – SUMMARY OF PRIVATE SEALED-BID  
AUCTION STUDY GROUP (2001-2003) 
 
 
Category 
 
Parameters 
           Total Projects             24 
 
           Successful Closings             18 (75%) 
 
           Closing Prices, $MM 
                 High 
                 Average 
                 Low                
 
             35.0 
             11.9 
               3.6 
           Average Market Metricsa 
                 Rate 
                 Cash Flow Payoutb 
                 Producing Reservesc 
      
            $21,535/BOEPD 
            45 months 
            $8.10/BOE 
 
   a6:1 MCF/BO equivalent conversion factor for gas 
   bClosing value/current cash flow per month 
   cClosing value/producing proved reserves 
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was the most common factor in unsuccessful projects.  Poor data quality damages seller 
credibility and erodes buyer confidence in an auction process.  The price received for a 
property is improved by integrating land, commercial and technical information into a 
concise historical overview and potential development plans.  Buyers have finite 
resources for evaluating assets, and what is not clearly presented generally receives less 
value. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4.2 Lease Sale 206 
Central Gulf of Mexico Lease Sale 206 in March 2008 set record winning bids of 
$3.7 billion on 615 separate blocks.  Analysis of LS 206 supports historical lease sale 
research presented in Section 2 as follows: 
 
 
Table 3.8 – STUDY GROUP REASONS  
FOR SELLING PROPERTIES 
 
 
Reason 
 
    Count (percent) 
 
           Profit 
 
        11 (45.8) 
 
           Non-Core Property 
 
          5 (20.8) 
 
           Developmental Risks                
 
          3 (12.5) 
 
           Operational Expense 
 
          3 (12.5)   
 
 
           Strategic Exit 
 
           1 (4.2)   
 
 
           Partner Conflict 
 
           1 (4.2)   
 
 
                   Total 
 
         24 (100)   
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• Tract bids tend to exhibit log-normal distributions. 
o Figures 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8 are semi-log graphs of bids values for LS 
206 tracts that received seven or more bids.  All four tracts follow a log-
normal pattern with trend line coefficient of determinations (R2) greater 
that 0.93.  Although not shown, this pattern holds true for tracts with four 
to six bids per tract. 
• Winning bids leave significant money on the table (LOT). 
o In LS 206 LOT (Bs/Bh) averaged 43.2% for the 223 tracts with two or 
more bids.  This represents a significant amount of collective money loss 
to bid winners.   
• Competition decreases the amount of money left on the table. 
o In LS 206 LOT averaged 59.3% for five or more bids in 27 tracts and 
41.0% for less than five bids in 196 tracts. 
• Competition increases the dispersion of average bid value. 
o In LS 206 the dispersion of high bids to the geometric mean of bids 
(Bh/Bg) averaged 3.7 for the 223 tracts.  Bh/Bg averaged 6.5 for five or 
more bids per tract and 3.3 for less than five bids. 
• Bidding jointly does not increase the chances of winning. 
o Fig. 3.9 compares the highest solo and joint bids of the top 20 winning 
bid blocks (three blocks did not have a joint bid) from LS 206.  
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Fig. 3.5—Federal lease sale 206, tract GC 945 bids by company. 
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Fig. 3.6—Federal lease sale 206, tract GC 944 bids by company.
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Fig. 3.7—Federal lease sale 206, tract GC 442 bids by company. 
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Fig. 3.8—Federal lease sale 206, tract KC 469 bids by company. 
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Fig. 3.9—Federal lease sale 206, comparison of the top solo and joint bids  
for the top 20 winning blocks. 
 
3.5 Summary 
The list below recaps a current industry view on auction strategy through 
interview surveys, confidential private sealed-bid survey results, and a case study of 24 
auction projects: 
• Competitive bid offers assign more value to non-proved reserves, manipulation 
of forward commodity price deck, and accepting of lower rate of returns on 
projects. 
• Top risks in valuing properties include commodity price, expenses, reserve ratio, 
and well concentration; however, commodity price dominates risk as it offers 
great upside and downside opportunity with its inherent uncertainty. 
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• Private sealed-bid auctions are perceived to bring better offers than oral-bid 
auctions when non-producing property value exceeds 30% of the total property 
value.  
• A private sealed-bid auction winner on an average can offer 10% less and retain 
a high probability of maintaining the winning position.  
• In approximately 10% of private sealed auctions an extreme gap in bid values 
exists between the winner and the competition. 
• More money is left on the table on the average in public federal sealed-bid lease 
sales compared to private sealed-bid auction properties. 
• Profit, non-core property, developmental risks and operational expenses are the 
most frequent reasons the study group properties were sold. 
• Poor data quality is a common factor in unsuccessful auctions. 
3.6 Notes 
1. The collapse in 2008 of the US financial markets and hydrocarbon prices may 
undo much of the perceived strategy value in reemergence of MLPs in upstream 
sector of the industry.  MLPs once before fell into discredit as an investment tool 
popular in 1980s with rising commodity prices only to be punished as prices 
suddenly dropped.  The commodity price cycle variance is similar then as it is 
now. 
 
2. Nordt, D.P. A Commercial Analysis Methodology for Acquisition Evaluations. 
Texas A&M Directed Study (April 2005) 1-17.  I have not published this paper 
and therefore, did not include in the reference section.  
   
3. Another key factor are sealed-bid auctions by the nature of the properties are 
usually of higher value than oral auctions.  Private sealed-bid auctions often use a 
purchase sales agreement [Nordt 2004] to negotiate the final transaction and 
allow time for a more thorough due diligence period. 
 
4. Microsoft Crystal Ball was used as the evaluation software.   
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4. AUCTION EXPERIMENTS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Section 4 examines bid behavior through simulated auction game experiments 
using industry participants.  The primary objective is to observe player strategies to 
changing auction signals (i.e., changes in common knowledge from a base case 
property).  The secondary objective was to establish an experimental approach for future 
private auction research.  The results support a theoretical understanding of general 
auction behavior and gives additional insight to private oil and gas auctions.   
I designed the game experiments and simulation logic.  The Texas A&M 
University Computer Science Department1 assisted in developing the web-site platform 
for these experiments.  The TAMU IRB Board approved Protocol #2007-0685 to 
conduct these human subject experiments under Code of Federal Regulations  45 CFR 
110(b) (1) as they involved no more than minimal risk to the participants. Following the 
beta tests, the actual experiments were conducted in 2009. 
Eighteen independent players participated in the game experiments out of 
approximately 120 requests from a community of integrated, independent, and 
consulting companies.  All players volunteered and had some knowledge of industry 
auction processes.  They were contacted through e-mail or verbal invitation to join in the 
game experiments, and then directed to a website for playing instructions preserving 
their anonymous participation.  
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Bid strategies are observed by analysis of composite player mean results between 
games.  The players’ challenge was to make an overall profit greater than the simulator 
competition by bidding on ten separate properties.  Bid risk varied between games by 
changing the common knowledge signals; however, common knowledge did not change 
between round 1 and round 2 of the same game.   Each player had access to equivalent 
common knowledge; though, competitor bid values could vary based on random number 
simulator routines that determined the competitor number and each competitor value 
based on probability distributions.  
Players received instruction that a bid value (actual value) exists that yields an 
acceptable profit within the given range.  The common knowledge also gave signals of 
the percent value by reserve classification (and sometimes competition level or the 
actual value) to establish the relative risk2 of submitting an offer.  Property utility was 
assumed neutral to all players.  The simulated competition presented the player with 
three bid outcomes for each auction game and round:  1) win with future profit; 2) win 
with future negative profit; and, 3) lose with no profit. 
4.2 Description 
4.2.1 Overview 
The experiments consist of ten independent auction games with two rounds per 
game.  Round 1 feature sealed-bids (i.e., the player does not know the simulated 
competitor bids).  Round 2 are oral-bids (i.e., the player observes the current high bid) 
and player receives a short time to better the current high bid or the auction closes.  The 
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highest competitor bid from round 1 remains the high bid for round 2 unless the player 
bids higher.   
Players receive common knowledge for each game shown in Table 4.1.  
Common knowledge is different for each of the ten games, but it is identical between 
rounds 1 and 2 of the same game. Game common knowledge includes a range in which 
the actual bid value lies that yields an acceptable profit3.   The actual value range 
includes a lower and upper limit.  The actual value is a function of competitor simulation 
bids and the player’s bid unless given in the common knowledge (games 5 and 10).  The 
percent actual value by reserve category sets the initial level of risk in the value range.  
Games 1 through 5 have 90% of their value in proved producing reserves and should 
have less value at risk as compared to games 6 through 10 where 50% of value is in 
proved producing reserves and 50% is in proved undeveloped reserves. 
 
 
TABLE 4.1—GAME COMMON KNOWLEDGE 
                 
          Game No. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
9 
 
10 
 
 
 Actual Value, mm$      
      Maximum 
 
      Minimum 
 
      Known     
 
 
 
60 
 
30 
 
??? 
 
 
 
600 
 
300 
 
??? 
 
 
 
60 
 
30 
 
??? 
 
 
 
60 
 
30 
 
??? 
 
 
 
60 
 
30 
 
55 
 
 
 
60 
 
30 
 
??? 
 
 
 
600 
 
300 
 
??? 
 
 
 
60 
 
30 
 
??? 
 
 
 
60 
 
30 
 
??? 
 
 
 
60 
 
30 
 
40 
 
 
 
 No. of Competitors 
 
 
??? 
 
??? 
 
2 
 
9 
 
??? 
 
??? 
 
??? 
 
2 
 
9 
 
??? 
 
 Reserve Value, % 
      
     Proved Producing 
 
     Proved Undeveloped 
 
 
 
 
 
90 
 
10 
 
 
 
 
90 
 
10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
90 
 
10 
 
 
 
 
90 
 
10 
 
 
 
 
90 
 
10 
 
 
 
 
50 
 
50 
 
 
 
 
50 
 
50 
 
 
 
 
50 
 
50 
 
 
 
 
50 
 
50 
 
 
 
 
50 
 
50 
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4.2.2 Rules 
The basic game rules are as follows: 
• Player competes against simulated competitors with common knowledge. 
• Player inputs round 1 game bids before advancing to round 2. 
• Player can not change a game bid in round 1 once he completes the game. 
• Player can not change a game bid in round 2 once he completes the game.      
• Player and competitor results are displayed after completing all games.   
A detail set of rules are given in Appendix A.1—Game Design Rules. 
4.2.3 Design Tests   
10,000 trials were run on each game to check the simulator logic for expected 
actual value results.  Summary of those trials are shown in Table 4.2.  Player bids were 
set at $45 million for the trial runs.  The actual values varied depending on relative 
uncertainty.   There was a ten-fold increase in range of actual values from $30-$60 
million to $300-$600 million in games 2 and 7; therefore, results of games 2 and 7 were 
multiplied by the scale factor of 0.10 to compare results with the other eight games.  
Games 5 and 9 give the actual value as common knowledge. 
Games 1 through 5 (predominately producing reserves) have actual values higher 
than games 6 through 10 (mixed reserves).  The simulator adjusts for the relative 
uncertainty in valuation as properties move from 90% producing to a 50% mix of 
producing and undeveloped property value.  The actual results of simulation trials agree 
with expectations for all ten games. 
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TABLE 4.2—EXPECTED SIMULATION BID BEHAVIOR AND RESULTS 
 
 
 
Actual Value 
 
Game Property Description Scenario Change Expected Results 
 
1 
 
 
Producing 
 
 
Base case 
 
 
n/a 
 
n/a 
 
2 
 
Producing 
 
 
Ten-fold increase in value range 
 
= Game 1 * 0.10 agree 
 
3 
 
 
Producing 
 
 
Two known competitors 
 
< Game 1 agree 
 
4 
 
Producing 
 
 
Nine known competitors 
 
> Game 1 agree 
 
5 
 
Producing 
 
 
Actual known value 
 
≈ Game 1 agree 
 
6 
 
Producing + 
Undeveloped 
 
Undeveloped 50% un-risk value 
 
 
< Game 1 agree 
 
7 
 
Producing + 
Undeveloped 
 
Undeveloped 50% un-risk value 
Ten-fold increase in value range 
 
 
= Game 6 * 0.10 
< Game 1 * 0.10 
agree 
agree 
 
8 
 
Producing + 
Undeveloped 
 
Undeveloped 50% un-risk value 
Two known competitors 
 
 
< Game 6 
< Game 1 
agree 
agree 
 
9 
 
Producing + 
Undeveloped 
 
Undeveloped 50% un-risk value 
Nine known competitors 
 
 
> Game 6 
< Game 1 
agree 
agree 
 
10 
 
Producing + 
Undeveloped 
 
 
Undeveloped 50% un-risk value 
Actual known value 
 
 
< Game 6 
< Game 1 
agree 
agree 
 
4.2.4 Beta Tests 
Beta tests identified potential issues with technical reliability and computer 
human interaction interface.  Final adjustments to the web-site, human game 
interactions, database functionality, and simulator followed from the results. 
4.2.5 Simulator Design 
 
The simulator design provides a mechanism for experimental studies and to keep 
player interest in a competitive game environment. Table 4.3 outlines the fundamental 
simulator process.   Details are given in Appendix A.2—Simulator Concept Logic.
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TABLE 4.3 —SIMULATOR PROCESS 
 
 
• Player is given common knowledge and simulator constraints for each game. 
 
• Player inputs a bid for each sealed-bid auction game. 
 
• A random number generator selects game competitors from a uniform distribution. 
 
• A random number generator selects competitor bid values from beta distributions. 
 
• Actual property value is a function of simulated competitor and player bids. 
 
• Player inputs bids for oral auction games. 
 
• Database stores game data for analyses. 
 
 
  
 
A player enters the game experiment website where he obtains common 
knowledge to make bid decisions.  A uniform random number generator selects 
competitors between one and nine, or it is given as common knowledge in games five 
and ten.  The minimum bid is the lower limit in the common knowledge as it guarantees 
a profit if it is the winning bid.  Sealed-bid auction games are played first.  A random 
number generator selects competitor bid values from a distribution.  The competitor and 
player bids are used to calculate an actual property value as a function of geometric 
mean and a scalar to ensure a reasonable probability of obtaining a profit for each game 
dependent on relative risk.  Player may replay the games; however, only the first 
participations are used in analyses. 
Data collected from player games for analyses includes the following:   
• Av  = actual value of property 
• Bch = highest competitor bid value 
• Bcs = second highest competitor bid value 
• Bp  = player bid value 
• Cp  = competitor profit = Av - Bw (competitor) 
• k  = game count 
• LOT = money left on table = Bw - Bs 
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• m  = player count 
• Mw  = player wins 
• n  = competitor count 
• Ncw  = competitor wins 
• Pp   = player profit = Av – Bw (player) 
• R1,2 = round 1 or round 2 
 
4.2.5 Web-site Design 
 
Details on are documented in Appendix A.3—Website Design Logic. 
 
4. 3 Results 
 
4.3.1 Overview 
 
The common knowledge for these auction games is the same for all players.  The 
games represent theoretical populations of different property types presented in the 
experiment.  The objective of the experiments is to determine how a sample of industry 
players perceives changing risk and uncertainty by analyses of bids for the theoretical 
populations.  Protocol requirements, website platform, time requirements, game 
complexity (design and application), and potential of learning bias required a single 
experiment trial.  This requirement added a tremendous pressure to the designer.  The 
game design, logic, and website platform evolved over a year of design and beta tests.   
Eighteen unique players participated in 360 games (i.e., 10 games x 2 rounds x 
18 players).  It takes each player 10 to 15 minutes to complete the game experiments as 
determined from beta tests.  The eight participants in the various beta tests were 
excluded from the actual experiment results.   
Table 4.4 shows the eighteen players won 24% of the total 360 games against 
simulated competition.  Players made a profit (i.e., not losing money) in 54% of the 
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games they won.  They won fewer times in round 1 (19%) and made less profit (30%) 
versus round 2 games. 
 
 
TABLE 4.4—PLAYER WIN AND PROFIT GAME COUNT 
 
 Round 1 Round 2 Total 
 
    Game Count 180 180 360 
    Win Count (%) 34 (19%) 54 (30%) 88 (24%) 
    Profit Count (%) 16 (47%) 32 (59%) 48 (54%) 
 
 
4.3.2 Analysis Process 
I use the averages of the mean player values for each game to review trends in 
bid behavior.  Additional detail appears in Appendix B—Statistical Analysis of Game 
Results.   
4.3.3 Results 
Fig. 4.1 presents the average player bids for each game.  Games 1 through 5 are 
producing properties and Games 6 through 10 are a mixture of producing and 
undeveloped properties.  Rounds 1 and 2 are shown side by side for each game.  The 
changes in common knowledge are annotated above each game; the reader can reference 
Table 4.1 for a complete description.   Observations for this set of experimental games 
include: 
• Producing properties received higher bids than mixed properties. 
o Producing properties are assumed to have less uncertainty as their 
valuation is based on historical production and cash flows. 
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• Oral auctions with the same common knowledge increased bids. 
o Oral auctions can drive bids higher through emotional involvement, and 
the assurance that the property is being valued similarly by competition.  
The experiments show support in using a hybrid process for traditional 
private sealed-bid auctions to include an oral auction component.  
• Competition increased bids in sealed-bid auctions. 
o The normal reaction in sealed-bid auctions is to increase bids in strong 
competition.   As we have seen from historical lease sales and theoretical 
studies this increases the chance of winner’s curse. 
• Property size did not change relative bids in the sealed-bid auctions. 
o A relative magnitude change will not change the rate of return on a 
property in theory; however, in the real world economy of scale may 
lower expenses which impacts rate of return. 
• A known value reduced uncertainty and variance of bids and increased or 
decreases bids depending on the known value bias. 
o If auction players know the actual value, then there would be less 
uncertainty and the bids would consistently center on the true value.  In 
the real world the actual value is never really known until abandonment, 
but this exercise emphasizes that reducing uncertainty in any parameter 
increases value. 
Figs. 4.2 and 4.3 review the same data as a function of bid ratios to compare different 
games for producing and mixed properties. 
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Fig. 4.1—Common knowledge changes average bids for experimental auction games. 
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Fig. 4.3—Common knowledge impacts average bid ratios for producing and undeveloped 
properties. 
 
4.4 Summary and Comment  
These game experiments generally support what we learned from auction theory 
in Sections 2 and 3, and emphasize concepts to formulate winning and profitable auction 
strategies.   
Sellers should consider the sealed-bid process for properties that include a large 
component of undeveloped value. Sellers should consider the oral auction for producing 
properties, and perhaps not be so concerned about size of the property.  Uncertainty 
reduces value: therefore, reasonable efforts should be made to provide good support data 
to potential buyers. 
Buyers should consider: 1) holding fast on their property valuations to avoid the 
herd mentality to increase bids in face of strong competition, 2) increasing value by 
reducing parameter uncertainties, 3) taking a long term portfolio strategy to avoid the 
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winner’s curse, and 4) reviewing competition level and changing market conditions prior 
to making a bid. 
4.5 Notes 
1.  Marlo Nordt, PhD Computer Science TAMU [2008)] developed the 
operational website. 
 
2. A producing property normally has less risk than a proved undeveloped 
property and increased competition generally increases the chance of 
overbidding.    
 
3. The actual value is calculated from an algorithm based on the geometric 
average of the bidder and competitors, and then multiplied by a scalar (based 
on calibration stochastic runs) dependent on the game and number of 
competitors. 
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5. VALUATION MODELS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This section examines bid valuation processes.  A valuation process should offer 
a consistent system valuing auction properties.    Auctions often occur over short 
durations1 from market to sale which can create an evaluation dilemma for buyers.  
Winning an auction is not hard, winning and making a profit is a more difficult 
proposition.  An opportunity could be by-passed through inadequate review, or hasty 
participation may lead to a bad investment decision.  The emphasis in this section is 
from a buyer’s prospective; however, a seller uses the same approaches in determining 
an acceptable reserve price for a auction property. 
5.2 Property Valuation   
5.2.1 Discounted Net Cash Flow 
The first step in setting a bid value is to determine the value of the property.  
Megill [1979] discusses converting exploration and development opportunities into cash 
flow streams as the basic analysis tool.  A cash flow stream charts inflow and outflow of 
all related funds over the life of an investment.  This cash flow model relates internal 
expenditures and revenue of a property, and provides a comparison with other 
properties.   Capan, Clapp, and Campbell [1971] comment on this method: 
We believe that methods involving the discounting of the cash flow stream are 
effective for the decision maker.  The criterion we prefer is present worth or 
present value (PW), using as the discount rate  the Internal or Investor’s Rate of 
Return (IRR) expected to be earned by the investor in the future.  The very 
essence of PW is that it is the value or worth we place on an investment 
opportunity at the present time. 
 59
Acquisitions through auctions are typically based on reserve reports generated 
from a discounted net cash flow approach.  Once the property value is determined a 
preliminary bid value can be established as a fraction of the estimated value.   
Acceptable risked economics can be finalized with the bid price included.    
5.2.2 Market Metrics 
The discounted cash flow model is the most widely used valuation approach, but 
market metrics can provide good estimates for property value as they measure the most 
current auction results.  Nordt [2004] notes market metrics assist in estimating value 
before expending resources in a more rigorous cash flow valuation.  Stevrig [1989] 
states the advantages of market metrics (valuation metrics) over the discounted net cash 
flow model are benchmarking from actual transactions, and the emphasis of market 
metrics follows the generally accepted concept of fair market value.    He observes that 
the primary disadvantage is they have not been used as much as discounted net cash 
flow, and they tend to overvalue long-life reserves2.   
Table 5.1 defines the three most common market metrics.  They include metrics 
based on reserves, production rate, and cash flow.  Market metrics depend on the most 
recent transactions. 
 
 
TABLE 5.1 – COMMON MARKET METRICS 
 
     Metric Description 
 
    Net Reserves Property value / net reserve classification 
    Net Rate Property value / net current production 
    Net Cash Flow Multiple Property value / net yearly cash flow 
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Table 5.2 demonstrates an example using market metrics.  In this example 
average market metrics of similar properties from East Texas and South Texas are 
available from recent sales.   Assume the discounted cash flow models yields a 
combined property risked proved present value of $280 million.  The average market 
value estimate in Table 5.2 is $285 million with a range of $267 to 298 million.  The 
market value is consistent with the cash flow model.   
 
 
TABLE 5.2 – EXAMPLE OF MARKET METRIC VALUATIONS 
 
Asset Area Property Characteristics Average of Recent Sales 
Similar Properties 
Market Value Estimates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PRV 
mmboe 
 
Rate 
boepd 
 
CF 
$mm/yr 
 
PRV 
$/boe 
 
Rate 
$/boepd 
 
CF 
Yrs 
 
PRV 
$mm 
 
Rate 
$mm 
 
CF 
$mm 
 
Avg 
$mm 
1 ETX 6.2 1,135 19.5 16.25 85,000 4.8 100.8 96.5 93.6 97.0 
2 STX 9.8 1,790 35.6 20.10 95,000 5.6 197.0 170.1 199.4 188.8 
Total        297.8 266.6 293.0 285.8 
 
 
 
Net cash flow multiples for oral auctions tend to be more constant over time and 
commodity price fluctuations [Nordt 2005].  Net value per reserve unit and net value per 
unit production tend to follow commodity price changes over time.  I hoped that after 
completing preliminary research3 that it might be possible to develop universal 
correlations of market metrics to commodity prices over a range of prices and time for 
both producing and undeveloped properties.  The original study correlated a time period 
with moderate variation in commodity prices and predominately producing properties.  
However, Figs. 5.1 and 5.2, using data from 370 US transactions [J.S. Herold 2008], 
show that universal market metric correlations for mixed properties4 are not possible 
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without detailed knowledge of other factors that influence these relationships (i.e., the 
coefficients of correlation are very low). 
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Fig. 5.1—Correlation oil price (WTI) to proved reserve market metrics, $/boe, from 370 US 
transactions 2000-2008 (data from John S. Herold, Inc. 2008). 
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Fig. 5.2—Correlation of oil price (WTI) to rate market metrics, $/boepd, from 381 US transactions 
2000-2008 (data from John S. Herold, Inc. 2008). 
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Despite their limitations market metrics are valuable in valuation analysis if 
market conditions, risks, and buyer/seller expectations are understood.  So how can we 
compensate for factors not in the market metrics?  I propose use of risk factors, 
illustrated by example in Table 5.3.  A property is initially assigned a neutral risk with 
index 1.0.  Risk factors less than one have a negative impact on values, and risk factors 
greater than one have a positive impact on values.  The evaluator considers each 
incremental risk factor as decreasing or increasing the index number.  A total risk factor 
is calculated using Eq.1.  The total risk factor is then multiplied by the un-risked 
property value in Eq. 2 to yield a risked value.    
 
 
TABLE 5.3 – EXAMPLE OF MARKET METRIC RISK FACTORS 
 
 
Tactical 
 
Strategic 
Description Incremental Factor Description Incremental Factor 
    Operational costs n/a     Price volatility                -0.2 
    Development costs -0.1     Regulator issues n/a 
   Reserves to production ratio -0.1     Regional infrastructure +0.2 
   Single well concentration n/a     Entry decision n/a 
   Environmental issues n/a    Competition -0.1 
              Sub Total -0.2 
 
          Sub Total          -0.1 
 
Total Risk Factor = 1 + Tactical Sub Total + Strategic Sub Total ………...   (1) 
Risk Value = (Value) x (Total Risk Factor) ……………………………….   (2) 
This approach is shown in the case history presented in Section 5.4, and it is analogous 
to the procedures of risking reserve input or reserve value output in a deterministic cash 
flow model.    
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5.3 Bid Models 
 
Oil and gas auction bid models in the literature vary from simple to complex, and 
their focus has been lease sales for undeveloped acreage.  Table 5.4 summarizes several 
representative models that have been published.   
 
 
 
TABLE 5.4—REPRESENTATIVE BID MODELS PRESENTED IN THE LITERATURE 
 
 
Year 
 
Investigator 
 
Model Description  
 
 
Type 
1956 Friedman 
 
Contract model uses historical data for probability distribution 
of true cost as fraction of estimated cost, probability distribution 
of bidding, probability distribution of winning, and expected 
profit from integration of distributions at a given bid level. 
 
Sealed-bid 
General 
1965 Arps 
 
Lease model estimates property value with deterministic and 
stochastic analyses of common information.  Statistical analysis 
assumes log normal distribution to determine mean value and 
standard deviation of previous lease sales.  Assumes geometric 
mean value as good indicators of the future value.  Probability 
distribution derived empirically relating historical mean bids to 
the winning bids. 
 
Sealed-bid 
Lease 
1966 Brown 
 
Lease model estimates the probability that any proposed bid will 
be the winning bid for a tract.  Three variables of focus are 
estimated present value of the tract, the likely number of 
competing bidders, and the probability distributions of possible 
competitor bids. 
 
Sealed-bid 
Lease 
1971 Capan, 
Clapp, 
Campbell 
 
Lease model assumes a log normal distribution of value 
estimates.  True property value (expected value) is geometric 
mean.  Estimate of competitors and probability of bidding 
needed.  Set bid fractions to calculate bids and determine winner 
and profit/loss.   
Sealed-bid 
Lease 
1975 Dougherty, 
Nazaki 
Lease model analogous to Capen, Clapp, and Campbell.  Study 
variable parameters of standard deviation of estimates, 
competitor estimates, number of competitors, and bid fraction of 
competitors.  Vary parameters to find optimum bid fractions for 
maximizing profit/loss.  
 
Sealed-bid 
Lease 
1977 Hartstock 
 
Lease model to compute the probability of winning with a given 
bid.  A Pearsonian analysis was performed on lease sales to 
identify functional forms of probability density functions, and 
regression analyses of past lease sales to provide estimate of 
model parameters.  
Sealed-bid 
Lease 
2008 Furtado, 
Suslick, 
Rodriguez 
 
Lease model assumes bid value as fraction of the estimate 
reserve value.  Value estimate is calculated through bid fraction 
probability distribution. 
Sealed-bid 
Lease 
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Reoccurring elements in these models include estimates of: 
• Property present value 
• Variance of present value 
• Bidder bid fraction 
• Number of competitors  
• Probability distribution of bidding 
• Probability distribution of winning 
The Capan, Clapp, and Campbell [1971] simulation model is the most referenced lease 
sale model.  Fig. 5.3 presents the logic and essential elements in their model.  I have 
changed some of their nomenclature to align with this dissertation. These models are 
helpful in formulating general lease sale strategies discussed in Section 2, but are 
difficult to apply because of historical information and assumptions necessary to 
estimate model elements. 
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Step Process Element
1 Set number of competitors (n) historical data
2 Set bid fraction (Bfn) for each (n) historical data
  
3 Actual property value (Av) equal to 1.0 assumption
  
4 Determine standard deviation (S) for each (n) historical data
  
5 START OR EXIT SIMULATION TRIAL  
  
6 Select if (n) bidding distribution
7 Select competitor value (Vc) as f(Av,S) distribution
8 Calculate each (n) bid value (Bn) = (Vc) * (Bfn)  
9 Determine highest bid (Bh) of (Bn)  
10 Start with your bid fraction (Bf) = 1.5
11 Calculate your bid value (Bp) = (Bf) * Av  
12 If (Bp) > (Bh), continue at next step 13
Else record loss count
Return to next trial at step 5
 
13 Record win count and profit (Pw) = (Av) - (Bp)  
 
14 If (Bf) = 0, return to next trial at step 5  
Else continue at next step 15
15 New (Bf) = (Bf) - 0.1  
16 Return to step 11 to calculate new (Bp)
 
Fig. 5.3—Example of simulation logic and essential elements adapted from the  
Capan, Clapp, Campbell (1971) lease sale bid model flowchart. 
 
5.4  Case Study 
I use a case study below to present a process for developing a bid model for 
private seal-bid auctions with data that obtained from sellers and other sources available 
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to buyers.  The company names are not provided to preserve confidentiality.  Production, 
reserves, cash flow, and transaction values are slightly scaled for the same reason.   
An established private energy company offers to sell a field with eight wells 
producing at a combined rate of 500 net barrels of oil per day with less than 
10% decline the last two years.  A structural closure contains the reservoir with 
a moderate water drive mechanism from the flanks.  75% of the production 
comes from two wells, and there is spacing above the oil/water contact to infield 
drill one to two undeveloped proved reserve locations to increase and accelerate 
oil recovery.  The net production to proved reserve ratio is 12.4 years.  WTI 
index oil price is currently at $35 per barrel oil with an average annual increase 
of 20% for the last two years.  The net cash flow averages $400 thousand per 
month.  The company wants to monetize a portion of its assets to distribute to the 
partners, but will not sell unless they can receive at least fair market value.  They 
have been advised by their auctioneer that the potential value of the reserves, 
uncertainty of the undeveloped reserves, and risk of down-dip production 
increasing water cut makes this property a candidate for a sealed-bid auction.   
 
An independent risked reserve report summarized in Table 5.5 values the property at $18 
million dollars before federal income tax.  This equals $7.94/bo for net proved reserves 
and $36,000/bopd net production rate.  The risked undeveloped reserves are 179 mbo 
(600 mbo unrisked).  Prior to the auction buyers have access to the same evaluation data 
used in preparing the risked reserve report; however, they are not given actual risked 
expected NPV of $18 million of the seller and auctioneer.   The high bid was $23 million 
which equates to $10.15/bo net proved reserves and $46,000/bopd net production.  The 
second bid was $17 million so the winner left $6 million on the table.   
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TABLE 5.5—SUMMARY OF NET RISKED RESERVES AND PRESENT VALUE 
 
 
Net Risked Proved Reserves, mbo 
 
NPV10 BFIT 
 
Net Production 
 
Net Cash Flow 
Producing 
 
Undeveloped $mm boepd $m/month 
2,088 
 
179 18.0 500 400 
 
 
Did the winner in this case study have a strategy?  A review of the average US 
transactions six months leading to this auction yields average market metrics of $9.73/bo 
and $42,944/bopd with an average R/P ratio of 13.4 years.  With these market metrics 
the property a fair market value would be calculated at $22.1 million on a $/bo basis and 
$21.5 million on $/bopd basis; however, these average metric values are not risked for 
this property. 
Table 5.6 presents the market metric approach adjusted for risk.  Most of the 
factors are considered risk neutral; however, the uncertainty of reserves and well 
concentration of production are negative factors.  When these factors are considered the 
risked adjusted metric values equals $15.3 million using equations 1 and 2:  
• Total Risk Factor = 1 + (-0.3) + (0.0) = 0.7 
• Risk Value = ((22.1 + 21.5) / 2) x (0.7) = $15.3 million 
Assuming a knowledgeable buyer’s reserve report is similar to the independent report in 
Table 5.5, and using a strategy of bidding 90% of $18 million yields a value of $15.5 
million.  Here a risked market metric value and a strategy of reducing a bid on a reserve 
report give very similar results.  The second bidder with an offer of $17 million appears 
to a reasonable bid, but the high bid of $23 million is a candidate to experience the 
winner’s curse. 
 
 68
 
TABLE 5.6 – ASSESSMENT OF RISK FACTORS 
 
 
Tactical 
 
Strategic 
Description 
 
Incremental Factor Description Incremental Factor 
    Operational costs 
 
  n/a     Price volatility   n/a 
    Development costs 
 
  n/a     Regulator issues   n/a 
    Reserves to production ratio 
 
 -0.2     Regional infrastructure   n/a 
    Single well concentration 
 
 -0.1     Entry decision   n/a 
    Environmental issues   n/a 
 
    Competition   n/a 
              Sub Total  -0.3           Sub Total            0.0 
 
 
 
 
The above strategy methodology would have lost this competitive auction; 
however, the objective is not to win at the expense of making a future profit.  If the 
second sealed bid had been the highest offer, then there is high probability the auctioneer 
would have invited us a chance to resubmit a second round sealed-bid.  This informal 
second round is common industry practice in private sealed-bid auctions.  This practice 
is potentially inefficient as some companies reduce their offers in anticipation of this 
occurrence.  I believe a better way is a hybrid auction consisting of a first round sealed-
bid auction, followed by a playoff round of the top sealed-bid qualifiers. 
5.5 Notes 
1. Review of top Energy Advisors websites for private sealed-bid auctions indicates 
that time from availability of evaluation materials to bid offers is about five 
weeks.  This period normally includes three to four weeks of data room 
presentations for potential buyers. 
 
2. The cash flow stream mirrors the longer life production.  When the stream is 
discounted from the future to the present it will be a smaller value as compared to 
market metrics without a discount factor. 
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3. Nordt, D.P. 2006. Market Value Metric Correlations. Texas A&M Directed Study 
Presentation, 1-15 (May).  Not published. 
 
4. Mix properties from this transaction database have a wide range of oil and gas 
reserves with different reserve classifications and production profiles. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
6.1 Section Review 
Section 1 framed the importance of a contemporary study on oil and gas auction 
strategies.  Auctions transact billions of dollars in property sales each year.  The majority 
of these transactions are through private auctions.  Federal lease auctions have been 
extensively studied from public data, but published work on private sealed-bid auctions 
essentially does not exist because of confidentiality requirements which make collecting 
data difficult. 
Section 2 examined game theory, federal lease sales and other studies for 
potential strategic application.  The published literature tends to be obscure and 
narrowed to lease sales.  I distilled the eclectic nature of the literature into a summary of 
key points for potential strategic application.   
Section 3 summarized the results of interviews conducted with industry 
professionals to present a current view of auction strategies.  The first group of 
interviews concentrated on the questions framed in the introduction.  The second group 
of interviews obtained samples of private sealed-bid results and indexed for 
confidentiality.  In addition, case studies for private sealed-bid auctions and record 
setting federal lease sale 206 were presented.  
Section 4 validated certain historical and current views through simulated auction 
game experiments using industry participants.   The experiments investigated relations 
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between oral and sealed bid auctions, relations between producing and undeveloped 
properties, and the influence of uncertainty on bid results.  
Section 5 presented bid valuation processes and applications.  The emphasis was 
on a consistent system for screening and valuing auction properties using cash flow 
models and market metrics.  Literature on lease sale models was summarized to 
demonstrate difficulties in obtaining data support.   A case history on a private sealed-
bid auction was reviewed to illustrate application of techniques to set a competitive, but 
potentially profitable bid level.       
6.2 Framing Questions and Findings 
1.  What auction strategies are currently used to acquire or divest of properties?   
Hypothesis 1a–auction players often participate in auctions without clearly defined 
strategies.   
Most interviewees believe their companies have clearly defined auction 
strategies; however, a smaller, but significant group of companies do not have 
consistent auction strategies. 
Hypothesis 1b–primary drivers in winning bids are tactical versus strategic:  aggressive 
forward price deck, inclusion of probable/possible reserves, and acceptance of lower 
project rate of returns. 
The top three winning strategies perceived by interviewees are aggressive 
valuation of non-proved reserves, an aggressive price deck, and acceptance of 
lower rate of returns. 
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Hypothesis 1c–Well concentration risk, lack of development potential, and data quality 
are the most common reasons that properties fail to sell in auctions. 
A case study of sealed-bid auctions concluded properties that did not sell at 
reserve value suffered primarily from poor quality data.  Bids are improved by 
integrating land, commercial and technical information into a concise historical 
overview and a future development plan. 
2.  Do bidding strategies from earlier research on federal offshore lease sales apply to 
contemporary private auctions?       
Hypothesis 2a–some auction research strategies developed for offshore federal leases 
apply to contemporary private property auctions.   
A review of auction game theory and federal offshore leases sale studies yielded 
common strategies applicable to private auctions: 
• Reducing uncertainty can increase bid levels.   
• Uncertainty causes greater variation in property values. 
• Reducing bid fraction with increased competition increases buyer profit. 
• Aggressive bidding results in a subpar buyer portfolio performance.   
• Joint bidding encourages aggressive bidding.  
• Inexperience encourages aggressive bidding.   
• Competition encourages aggressive bidding. 
• Increased competition contributes to the winner’s curse.   
Hypothesis 2b–bid models from theory and lease sales research require modification to 
accommodate uncertainty in value. 
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Lease models are helpful in formulating general auction strategies discussed, but 
are difficult in adapting to private sealed-bid auctions because of historical 
information and assumptions necessary to estimate model parameters.  Sufficient 
data to develop private auction models are not available.  A combination of a 
risked cash flow and market metric models appear to yield good results and are 
favored by the industry.    
3.  Which auction process, sealed-bid or oral, brings more value to the seller? 
Hypothesis 3a–The sealed-bid auction process brings more value to seller when 
development potential exceeds 30% of the total property value. 
Interviewees believe properties that exceed 30% in undeveloped reserves receive 
higher bids in a sealed-bid process. 
4.  Can market metrics correlate to commodity price and risk?   
Hypothesis 4a–market metrics based on $/BOE, $/BOEPD, and annual cash-flow 
multiples can correlate to historical commodity price and risk. 
I was not successful in finding meaningful correlations of market metrics with 
historical commodity prices.  Universal market metric correlations for mixed 
properties are not likely without detail knowledge of other factors that influence 
these relationships.    
Hypothesis 4b–Risked market metric correlations can yield valuations similar to more 
rigorous risked cash-flow modeling. 
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The results of Hypothesis 4a fails this hypothesis by association; however, I 
present a case study that demonstrates a process of risking universal market 
metrics for a specific time period that matches well with cash-flow modeling.  
6.3 Future Research 
This dissertation touched on numerous areas that could use additional study, but I 
believe three areas particularly need further research.   These are refinement of simulated 
bid models for private auctions, a comparative study of e-bay styled internet versus live 
oral auctions, and investigation of hybrid private auctions.   
I approach development of a simulated bid model for website research 
experiments used in this dissertation.  The biggest challenge to private sealed-bid 
research is getting confidential data to analyze.  This study demonstrates it is possible to 
gain knowledge in this area by interactive auction experiments with practicing 
professionals.     
I did not investigate internet versus live oral auctions.  This auction type is 
dominated by a few auctioneers because of the relatively low profit margins and high 
entry costs; however, as more US properties reach full development and offer only 
decline curve value, internet auctions offer cost effective liquidity. 
I did not investigate hybrid auctions.  To my knowledge it is has not been used 
by the industry.  Auctioneers that sell properties through the sealed-bid process typically 
receive bids, and then they re-approach the top bidders to consider resubmitting a higher 
bid.  Although this is standard practice, in my opinion a hybrid auction using a 
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combination of sealed bid and play-off oral auctions could be more efficient and perhaps 
more professional.  
6.4 Final Comment 
I surmise from this assorted work that the most essential strategic ingredients to 
successful oil and gas auction participation include: 
• Knowledge and recognition of current market conditions. 
• Unbiased appraisal of property value and associated risks. 
• Recognition of portfolio impact and constraints. 
• Reasonable intelligence on potential competitors. 
• Selection of the appropriate auction process. 
• Discipline to believe in basic auction strategies. 
• Participation on a regular basis. 
Box [2008], writing on investment portfolios in petroleum ventures, asserts “too 
much risk in a series of investments can lead to spectacular ruin, and alternatively, too 
little risk leads to unspectacular defeat overtime.”  Auction players bear this burden and 
for those that play the game I offer you my reflections on the subject: 
• The frequent auction player with a consistent bid strategy constraining himself to 
a risked profit bid can win on occasion and has a better chance of sustaining a 
profitable portfolio over time.   
• A frequent auction player without strategy or profit constraints has a low chance 
of a profitable portfolio over time.   
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• The infrequent player, with or without a strategy, plays a high risk game as he 
often struggles with inexperience in analyses, processes, and bid strategies. 
• The infrequent player tends to buy high and sell low with underperforming 
assets.   
Frequent players that have strategic discipline can be successful in the oil and gas 
auction game, as buyer or seller, over the long haul.  All other categories of auction 
players rely on a probabilistic event called “dumb luck”.  It is analogous to a trip to Las 
Vegas and coming back significantly richer.  It happens, but rarely. 
 
 77
REFERENCES 
 
Arps, J.J. 1965. A Strategy for Sealed Bidding. JPT 17 (9): 1033-1039. SPE-1095-
PA. 
 
Barrow, T.D. 1972. Hearings before the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 
U.S. Senate, Pursuant to S. Res. 45, A National Fuels and Energy Policy Study, 
Ninety-Second Congress, Second Session, on Oversight on Outer Continental Shelf 
Lands Act, March 23, 30 and April 11, 18, Serial No. 92-97, Part 2. 
 
Binmore, K. 1992. Fun and Games, A Text on Game Theory, 523-536. Lexington, 
Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company.  
 
Box, R. 2008. Avoiding Gambler's Stalemate:  Strategies for Investing in Petroleum 
Ventures. Oil & Gas Financial Journal 5 (6): 34-45. 
 
Brown, K.C. 1966. A Theoretical and Statistical Study of Decision-Making Under 
Uncertainty: Competitive Bidding for Leases on Offshore Petroleum Lands. 
Dissertation: Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas. 
 
Capen, E.C. Clapp, R.V. and Campbell, W.M. 1971. Competitive Bidding in High 
Risk Situations. JPT 23 (6):641-653. SPE-2993-PA. 
 
Crawford, P.B. 1970. Texas Offshore Bidding Patterns. JPT  22 (3): 283-289. SPE-
2613-PA. 
 
Cronquist, C. 2001. Estimation and Classification of Reserves of Crude Oil, Natural 
Gas, and Condensate, 1-32. Richardson, Texas: Society of Petroleum Engineers. 
 
Deep Pockets for Deepwater in GoM Sale 205. Wood McKenzie Upstream Insights 
(October 2007) 1-9.  
 
Deutsche Bank. Upstream “MLP Mania:” A Closer Look. 2007. Oil & Gas 
Exploration & Production E&P Monthly (27 April) 1-15. 
 
Dougherty, E.L and Nozaki, M. 1975. Determining Optimum Bid Fraction. JPT  27 
(3): 349-356. SPE-4566-PA. 
 
Dougherty, E. L. and Lohrenz, J. 1976. Statistical Analyses of Bids for Federal 
Offshore Leases. JPT  28 (11): 1377-1390. SPE-5583-PA. 
 
 78
Dougherty, E. L. and Lohrenz, J. 1977. Money Left on the Table in Sealed, 
Competitive Bidding. Paper SPE 6501 presented at SPE Hydrocarbon Economics 
and Evaluation Symposium, Dallas, Texas, 21-22 February. DOI: 10.2118/6501-MS. 
 
Dougherty, E.L. and Lohrenz, J. 1977. Statistical Analyses of Solo and Joint Bids for 
Federal Offshore Oil and Gas Leases. Paper SPE 6517 presented at SPE, 47th 
Annual California Regional Meeting, Bakersfield, California, 13-15 April. DOI: 
10.2118/6517-PA. 
 
Friedman, L. 1956. A Competitive-Bidding Strategy. Operations Research 4 (1): 
104-112. 
 
Furtado, R., Suslick S., and Rodriguez, M. 2008. A Method to Estimate Block 
Values Through Competitive Bidding. AAPG Bulletin 92 (10): 1293-1314. 
 
Garb, F.A. 1990. Which Fair-Market-Value Method Should You Use? JPT  42 (1): 
8-17. DOI: 10.2118/20276-PA. 
 
Grayson, C. Jackson Jr. 1960. Decisions Under Uncertainty:  Drilling Decisions by 
Oil and Gas Operators, 1-397. Boston, Massachusetts: Harvard Business School, 
Division of Research, Published Book. 
 
John S. Herold, Inc. and Harrison Lovegrove & Co. Limited. 2008. Global M&A 
Upstream Review, 27-28. Norwalk, Connecticut. 
 
John S. Herold, Inc. 2008. 41st Annual Global Upstream Performance Review - Top 
50 U.S. Companies, 1-10. Norwalk, Connecticut. 
 
Kagel, J.H. and Levin, D. 1986. The Winner's Curse and Public Information in 
Common Value Auctions. The American Economic Review 76 (5): 894-926. 
 
Klemperer, P. 1999. Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature, 1-95. Nuffield 
College, Oxford University, UK, Published Paper. 
 
Lohrenz, J. 1978. Aggregated Internal Rates of Return for Federal Offshore Oil and 
Gas Leases:  Gulf of Mexico Leases Issued in 1969 and Prior Years (LPR-19C Data 
Bases), Applied Research and Analysis Section Report No. 79-8, Conservation 
Division, U.S. Geological Survey, 27 Nov. 
 
Lohrenz, J. 1987. Bidding Optimum Bonus for Federal Offshore Oil and Gas Leases. 
JPT  39 (9): 1102-1112. SPE-15992-PA. 
 
Lohrenz, J. 1988. Profitabilities on Federal Offshore Oil and Gas Leases:  A Review. 
JPT 40 (6): 760-764. SPE-16313-PA. 
 79
 
Lohrenz, J. 1991. Competitive Bidding for Oil and Gas Production Assets: How the 
Pie Is Divided. Paper SPE 22039 presented at Hydrocarbon Economics and 
Evaluation Symposium, Dallas, Texas, 11-12 April. DOI: 10.2118/22039-MS. 
 
Lohrenz, J. and Dougherty, E.L. 1977.  A Study of the Aggressive/Conservative 
Patterns of Bidders and Presale Evaluation: Federal Oil and Gas Lease Sales. Paper 
SPE 6807 presented at Annual Fall Technical Conference and Exhibition held in 
Denver, Colorado, Oct. 9-12. DOI: 10.2118/6807-MS. 
 
Lohrenz, J. and Dougherty, E.L. 1983. Bonus Bidding and Bottom Lines: Federal 
Offshore Oil and Gas. Paper SPE 12024 presented at 58th Annual Technical 
Conference and Exhibition, San Francisco, California, 5-8 October. DOI: 
10.2118/12024-MS. 
 
Longnecker, M. and Ott, R.L. 2001.  Statistical Methods and Data Analysis 5th 
edition, 192-339.  Pacific Grove, California: Duxbury. 
 
Megill, R. 1979. An Introduction to Exploration Economics, 1-180. Tulsa, 
Oklahoma: Petroleum Publishing Company. 
 
Meade, W.J. and Sorensen, P.E. 1980. Competition and Performance on OCS Oil 
and Gas Lease Sales and Lease Development, 1954-1969, Final Report, U.S. 
Geological Survey Contract No. 14-08-001-16522, 1 March. 
 
Nordt, D.P. 2005. The Property Auction. The Oil and Gas Investor 25 (8): 69-71. 
 
Nordt, D.P. 2004. Successful Divesting. The Oil and Gas Investor 24 (11): 49-52. 
 
Oil and Gas Investor’s A&D Watch  23 (1): 15 (January 2009). 
 
Phillips, N.V and Summers, S.M. 1983. Bidding Models for Offshore Oil and Gas 
Lease Sales. Paper SPE 2799 available from SPE, Richardson, Texas. 
 
Rasheed, W.  2009. The Oil Curtain and the Evolution of National Oil Companies. 
JPT 61 (2): 36-39. 
 
Roberge, R. 2005. Cautious Investment Approach Driving Oil Company Strategies. 
Oil & Gas Financial Journal. 2 (5): 37-42. 
 
Rose & Associates, LLP. 2007. Risk Analysis for Development Applications: Section 
3, Estimating Under Uncertainty, 1-35. Houston, Texas: Training Manual. 
 
 80
Society of Petroleum Evaluation Engineers.  2002. Perspectives on The Fair Market 
Value of Oil and Gas Interests, 1-89.  Richardson, Texas. 
 
Stark, P. 2007. The Winds of Change: Resource Nationalism Shifts the Balance of 
Power to National Oil Companies. JPT  59 (1): 34-36. 
 
Stevens, S.P. 2008. Games People Play: Game Theory in Life, Business, and 
Beyond, 1-124. Chantilly, Virginia: The Teaching Co. 
 
Strevig, W.E. 1989. Valuation of Oil Gas Reserves by the Comparative Method. 
Paper SPE 18907 presented at the SPE Hydrocarbon Economics and Evaluation 
Symposium, Dallas, Texas, 9-10 March. DOI: 10.2118/18907-MS. 
 
Tertzakian, P. 2006. A Thousand Barrels A Second, 1-272. New York: The McGraw-
Hill Companies. 
 
U.S. Offshore Long Way from Paying Off. The Oil and Gas Journal 68 (27): 55-56. 
 
US Department of Interior MMS (2009).  Table 1—All Lease Offerings: 1-5. 
 
Wetuski, J. 2001. Hedging Softens the Blow of Skyrocketing Energy Costs. 
Houston, Texas: A Supplement to Oil & Gas Investor, The Effective Energy Risk 
Management Program: 2-4 (October).  Houston, Texas:  Magazine Insert. 
 
Wilson, H.M. and Kennedy, J.L. 1969. Offshore Know-how Racing But Costs Look 
Formidable. The Oil and Gas Journal 67 (21): 35-38. 
 81
APPENDIX A 
 
SIMULATED AUCTION GAME DESIGN 
 
A.1 Game—Design Rules 
Player objective is to make a profit by submitting bids on oil and gas auction properties. 
1. There are ten independent auction games with two rounds per game. 
 
2. Round 1 are sealed-bid auctions . . . player does not know competitor bids. 
 
3. Round 2 are oral-bid auctions . . . player knows the current high bid. 
 
4. Each game has a different set of common knowledge (Table A1, signals). 
 
 
 
 
TABLE A1—GAME COMMON KNOWLEDGE SIGNALS 
                 
          Game No. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
9 
 
10 
 
 
 
 Actual Value, mm$      
      Maximum 
 
      Minimum 
 
      Known     
 
 
 
60 
 
30 
 
??? 
 
 
 
600 
 
300 
 
??? 
 
 
 
60 
 
30 
 
??? 
 
 
 
60 
 
30 
 
??? 
 
 
 
60 
 
30 
 
55 
 
 
 
60 
 
30 
 
??? 
 
 
 
600 
 
300 
 
??? 
 
 
 
60 
 
30 
 
??? 
 
 
 
60 
 
30 
 
??? 
 
 
 
60 
 
30 
 
40 
 
 
 
 No. of Competitors 
 
 
??? 
 
??? 
 
2 
 
9 
 
??? 
 
??? 
 
??? 
 
2 
 
9 
 
??? 
 
 Reserve Value, % 
      
     Proved Producing 
 
     Proved Undeveloped 
 
 
 
 
 
90 
 
10 
 
 
 
 
90 
 
10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
90 
 
10 
 
 
 
 
90 
 
10 
 
 
 
 
90 
 
10 
 
 
 
 
50 
 
50 
 
 
 
 
50 
 
50 
 
 
 
 
50 
 
50 
 
 
 
 
50 
 
50 
 
 
 
 
50 
 
50 
 
 
5. Common knowledge always includes a range in which the actual value exists. 
 
6. Common knowledge always includes percent un-risked reserve category values. 
             
7. Common knowledge includes the number of competitors in games 3, 4, 8, and 9.  
 
8. Common knowledge includes the actual value of the property in games 5 and 10. 
 
9. Player competes against simulated competitors. 
 
10. Player submits no-bid with zero. 
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11. Bid it cannot be changed after submitted as final bid. 
 
12. Bid results will be displayed after completing all the games in rounds 1 and 2. 
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A.2 Simulator—Concept Logic 
 
Step 1—Use Beta distribution from sample industry sealed-bid results to determine competitor bids.
TABLE A1—BETA DISTRIBUTION TABLE A2—BID LOOKUP TABLE
Percent Cum Prob. Fraction Cum Prob. $30mm<Bid<$60mm
0% 0.12 0.000 0.12 33.54330
5% 0.34 0.050 0.34 40.16390
10% 0.41 0.100 0.41 42.16940
15% 0.46 0.150 0.46 43.76350
20% 0.50 0.200 0.50 44.96410
25% 0.54 0.250 0.54 46.06640
30% 0.57 0.300 0.57 47.16750
35% 0.61 0.350 0.61 48.20530
40% 0.64 0.400 0.64 49.08300
45% 0.66 0.450 0.66 49.89910
50% 0.69 0.500 0.69 50.68930
55% 0.72 0.550 0.72 51.54060
60% 0.74 0.600 0.74 52.28870
65% 0.77 0.650 0.77 53.06330
70% 0.80 0.700 0.80 53.85930
75% 0.82 0.750 0.82 54.61580
80% 0.85 0.800 0.85 55.38970
85% 0.87 0.850 0.87 56.23120
90% 0.90 0.900 0.90 57.12040
95% 0.94 0.950 0.94 58.12760
100% 1.00 1.000 1.00 59.98930
Fig. A1—Cumlative beta distribution from sample industry sealed-bid results. 
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Step 2—Generate random numbers (0.0-1.0) for nine potential competitors.
Competitor Random No.
B1 0.782
B2 0.580
B3 0.274
B4 0.629
B5 0.699
B6 0.665  
B7 0.719  
B8 0.563
B9 0.057
Fig. A2—A random number is generatated to match each competitor.
Step 3—Match each potential competitor random number with an interpolated bid from lookup table (Table A2).
Competitor Random No. Bid, $mm
B1 0.782 53.063
B2 0.580 47.168
B3 0.274 33.543
B4 0.629 48.205
B5 0.699 50.689
B6 0.665 49.899
B7 0.719 51.541
B8 0.563 46.066
B9 0.057 49.083
Fig. A3—Each competitor bid is matched to a random number.
Step 4—Player enters game bid.  
 
Bp, $mm Game (k) Low High Given Competitors  
45.000 1 30 60 ??? 6  
If games 2 or 7 divide by 10 to normalize range of bids to other games.  
 
Step 5—Determine number of simulated competitors from random number (0.0-1.0).  
 
Random No. Competitors (n)        
0.72112 6       
 
Step 5—Register bids.
Bidder Bid, $mm Rank
Bp 45.000
B1 53.063 1
B2 47.168 5
B3 33.543 6
B4 48.205 4
B5 50.689 2
B6 49.899 3
B7 no bid no bid
B8 no bid no bid
B9 no bid no bid Fig. A4—Simulated competitors determined.
Actual Value
0.782
0.580
0.274
0.629 0.699 0.665
0.719
0.563
0.057
0.000
0.200
0.400
0.600
0.800
1.000
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Competitor
R
an
do
m
 N
um
be
r
53.063
47.168
33.543
48.205 50.689 49.899
51.541
46.066
49.083
30
40
50
60
0.782 0.580 0.274 0.629 0.699 0.665 0.719 0.563 0.057
Random Number
C
om
pe
tit
or
 B
id
, $
M
M
45.0
53.1
47.2
33.5
48.2 50.7 49.9
30
40
50
60
Bp B1 B2 B3 B4 B5 B6 B7 B8 B9
Bidderr
B
id
, $
M
M
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Step 7—Calculate geometric mean of bids.
Būg, $mm 46.365 = (Bp x B1 x B2 x . . . x Bn)1/(n+1)
             If Bp is less than $45.000 mm, use $45.000 mm to calculate geometric mean.
Step 8—Scalars for calculating actual value to optain a probability of profit.
  
   
No. of Competitors 1-3 4-6 7-9    
Games 1-5 1.300 1.250 1.195     
Games 6-10 1.200 1.180 1.100     
    
Step 9—Calculate results actual value and profitability.     
    
    
No. of Competitors 1-3 4-6 7-9     
Games 1-5 0.000 57.957 0.000     
Games 6-10 0.000 0.000 0.000     
    
No. of Competitors 6       
Player bid (Bp) 45.000       
Competitor High Bid (Bch) 53.063        
High bid, $mm 53.063 Competitor Wins     
     
Profit, $mm     
No. of Competitors 1-3 4-6 7-9     
Games 1-5 0.000 4.894 0.000     
Games 6-10 0.000 0.000 0.000     
       
Step 10—Store data for analysis.   
  
Av actual value 
Bch highest competitor bid
Bcs second highest competitor bid   
Bp player bid    
Cp competitor profit    
k game count    
LOT money left on table    
m player count   
Mw player wins
n competitor count
Ncw competitor wins
Pp player profit
R1,2 round 1 or 2
Scalars
Actual Value, $mm
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Step 11—Demonstrate example of data for Bp parameter.
Game 1 2 3
Player
1 47.422 44.128 43.500
2 42.861 40.398 41.320
3 47.975 43.898 42.341
4 38.852 45.543 33.000
5 45.441 46.653 42.031
6 50.696 50.303 42.310
7 38.388 41.112 37.000
8 47.261 48.886 45.000
9 47.261 50.206 44.000
10 44.778 48.865 43.213
Pū 45.094 45.999 41.372
Pσ 3.995 3.599 3.643
Pσ2 15.96 12.953 13.271
m 10 10 10
SE 1.263 1.138 1.152
Step 12—Analyze composite player behavior by significance of the difference of means.
 
Pū mean of all player bid values each game 
Pσ standard deviation of all player bid values each game 
m player count
SE standard error of all player bid values for each game [Pσ ÷ (m1/2)]
z (two tail) z ratio of differences [(Pū2-Pū1) ÷ (SE22 - SE12)1/2]
Game Pū Ps m SE
1 45.094 3.995 10 1.263
2 45.999 3.599 10 1.138
3 41.372 3.643 10 1.152
Compare Games 1-2 1-3
z (two tail) -0.533 2.177 If z>±1.96 reject null hypothesis at 95% confident level.
Ho Reject
Round 1
Round 1
Round 1—Player Bids, $mm
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A.3 Website—Design Logic  
 
A website was created to host the game experiments described in Section 5.  Fig. 
A5 illustrates the website design logic.   
 
 
Fig. A5—Website logic design of the simulated auction games. 
 
 
The database, MySQL, stores the user (player) input simulator bids, match settings (i.e., 
common knowledge, game order, etc.), and player/group login information (i.e., 
password; group name).  The database connector is written in PHP.  It includes all the 
logic for getting information from and to the game controller and storing information in 
the database.  The game controller is written in PHP, and it acts as the game logic, 
central controller for handling game flow.  The competition simulator is written in PHP, 
and all the simulation logic resides there.  The user interface is written as a combination 
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of HTML, CSS, and Javascript which includes the JQuery library.  HTML = basic web 
page; CSS (cascading style sheets) = basic look and feel; and, Javascript = interactive 
page with advanced look and feel.  JQuery is written in Javascript that the code accesses. 
Game logic, simulator logic, and interface designs are unique. Website 
technology and general design are common.  The website design followed a "user-
centric design process".  We started with a user interface prototype to help focus on the 
user experience before coding the program logic.  The entire process was beta tested 
several times to determine user-interaction difficulties.  We practice good design 
principles by keeping interface and game logic simple to prevent overloading users with 
too much information.  Visual cues were used to emphasize certain information (e.g., 
common knowledge changes between rounds is highlighted in blue and the timer 
changes colors from green to red when oral auctions get to final five seconds).  Finally, 
the most important feature is the interactive website to make experiment participation 
more enjoyable and realistic. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF GAME RESULTS 
 
I reference Longnecker and Ott [2001] for the analysis parameters1 below: 
• df  = degrees freedom 
• m  = player count (sample size) 
• Pū  = mean of all player bid values for each game 
• p-value = probability level of significance  
• Pσ  = standard deviation of all player bid values for each game  
• Sp  = common standard deviation of two populations 
• t-test = test statistic 
Table B1 summarizes the parameters derived2 from the experimental data.  The 
assumptions under which tests are valid are: 1) random, independent player samples, 2) 
normal population distributions with approximately equal variances, and 3) sufficient 
sample sizes.   
 Assumptions one and two are believed to be satisfied.  I am not sure on the 
sample size.  In a controlled experiment with unlimited supply of subjects that is 
possible, but in the private auction world data is hard fought.  Finding qualified 
candidates for participation was the first hurdle.  The next hurdle was equally hard; it 
depended on the good will of very busy participants to allow a half of hour to play the 
games.  The intent of the experiments was support (or at least not refute) conclusions 
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reached in general auction theory and the limited focus of federal lease studies.  To that 
extent the objective was met as described in Section 4. 
 
 
TABLE B1—SUMMARY OF STATISTICAL  PARAMETERS  
DERIVED FROM EXPERIMENTAL DATA 
 
 
 
Round 1 
 
Round 2 
 
 
Game 
 
Pū 
 
Pσ 
 
M  
 
Pū 
 
Pσ 
 
m  
1 48.139 7.768 18  49.567 6.918 9  
2 47.294 6.666 17  46.301 9.542 14  
3 47.522 9.057 18  52.569 5.027 13  
4 50.788 9.665 17  52.694 6.633 16  
5 51.583 6.208 18  49.973 9.131 15  
6 41.889 8.203 18  42.553 8.927 16  
7 40.800 6.625 15  47.216 8.873 15  
8 40.813 8.750 16  48.400 6.507 16  
9 43.281 9.957 16  48.253 6.947 15  
10 
 
38.917 
 
5.542 
 
18 
 
 39.950 
 
3.706 
 
16 
 
 
 
 
Tables B2 and B3 compare combinations of mean differences between game bids 
for proved producing and proved undeveloped properties.  Table B2 also compares a 
proved producing (game 1) to proved undeveloped (game 6) property. The t-test and p-
values are listed. 
 
 
TABLE B2—COMPARISON OF PROVED PRODUCING PROPERTY BIDS 
 
 
 
Round 1  
 
Round 2 
Games: 2-1 3-1 4-1 5-1 4-3 *6-1  2-1 3-1 4-1 5-1 4-3 *6-1 
t .38 .20 .81 1.67 1.00 2.27  .80 1.38 1.13 .11 .05 .73 
p .71 .84 .42 .11 .33 .00  .43 .18 .14 .92 .96 .47 
    
*comparison of producing and undeveloped properties 
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TABLE B3—COMPARISON OF PROVED UNDEVELOPED PROPERTY BIDS 
 
 
 
Round 1  
 
Round 2 
Games: 7-6 8-6 9-6 10-6 8-9   7-6 8-6 9-6 10-6 8-9  
t .47 .36 .41 1.61 1.22   1.46 2.54 2.28 1.99 .21  
p .53 .72 .69 .12 .23   .15 .02 .03 .06 .83 
 
 
 
 
Table B3 compares mean differences between sealed bid and oral auction games 
of rounds 1 and 2.  
 
 
TABLE B3—COMPARISON OF SEALED BID AND ORAL AUCTION PROPERTY BIDS 
                =  
Round 1 – Round 2 
 
Games 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
9 
 
10 
 
t .51 .29 2.76 .83 .50 .22 1.98 3.30 1.99 .81 
p .62 .78 .00 .42 .62 .83 .06 .00 .06 .42 
 
 
Notes: 
 
1. Some of the nomenclature abbreviations are different from Longnecker and Ott 
(2001) to provide consistency within this dissertation. 
 
2. I used Excel ToolPak add-in and a university website calculator for 
independent verification of the calculations. 
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